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ABSTRACT 
 
RETHINKING THE INTERNATIONAL AND SECURITY 
THROUGH THE CITY 
 
Karacan, Sezgi 
M.A., Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Ali Bilgiç 
 
September 2014 
 
 
Although territorial physical borders are still relevant, other forms of 
bordering take place daily that are not in line with the imagination of the 
international as a space of territorially demarcated sovereign states. Urban 
space is a part of this identity making and spatializing process of (re)mapping 
the international. Engaging with practices and understandings of security 
reveals different experiences of urban, hence different imaginations of the city 
and the international. In this light, questioning the interaction between city, 
security and the international, this thesis asks how the bordering of cities 
plays in the construction of the international and its subjects through practices 
and understandings of (urban) security and insecurity. Firstly, different 
bordering practices within cities and their associated imagination of the 
international is examined. Then, informed by and informing such 
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imaginations, how authorities and professionals reborder the city and how the 
city is made ‘safe’ against those parts of the city that are deemed as dangerous 
is discussed. While this gives an understanding of how the everyday is shaped 
by security, final part questions how urban dwellers in their daily lives shape 
security understandings. This thesis argues that existing politics of the 
international that generates insecurities and inequalities work through 
bordering of cities and this is depoliticized through the existing politics of 
security both in the ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ world. The aim of the thesis 
is to reach a less state-centric and a more bottom-up approach in 
understanding and rethinking the relationship between city, security and the 
international. 
 
Keywords: the international, urban space, borders, security, the everyday, 
global city, globalization, urbanization 
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ÖZET 
 
‘ULUSLARARASI’NI VE GÜVENLİĞİ  
KENT ÜZERİNDEN YENİDEN DÜŞÜNMEK 
 
Karacan, Sezgi 
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Ali Bilgiç 
 
Eylül 2014 
 
 
Devletlerin fiziksel duvarlarla ördüğü toprak sınırları önemini koruyor olsa 
da, ‘uluslararası’nı devlet sınırları ile bölünmüş bir alan olarak tahayyül 
etmek, gündelik hayatta da tecrübe edilen farklı sınır pratikleri ile gittikçe 
zorlaşmaktadır. Kent mekanı, bu sınırların oluşturulduğu ve böylece 
uluslararası alanın yeniden düzenlendiği ve farklı kimliklerin kurulduğu bir 
alan olarak ortaya çıkmaktadır. Bu sınırların oluşturulmasında ve 
korunmasında güvenlik anlayışları ve politikaları rol oynamaktadır. Farklı 
güvenlik anlayış ve pratiklerine odaklanmak, farklı kent deneyimleri ve bu 
sayede de kentin ve ‘uluslararası’nın farklı tahayyül olanaklarını ortaya 
çıkarmaktadır. Bu tez, kent, güvenlik ve ‘uluslararası’nın ilişkiselliğini 
tartışırken, şu soruyu sormayı amaçlamaktadır: kent güvenliği ve güvensizliği 
anlayış ve pratikleri yoluyla, kentler üzerinden oluşturulan sınırlar 
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‘uluslararası’nı ve ‘uluslararası’nın öznelerini nasıl kurar? Bu soruyu 
cevaplamak için öncelikle uluslararası ilişkilerde sınır anlayışı 
sorunsallaştırılmakta ve kentler üzerinden kurulan sınırlar ile bunların 
uluslararasının tahayyülü açısından ne ifade ettiği tartışılmaktadır. İkinci 
olarak, hakim güvenlik anlayışlarının ve pratiklerinin kentteki gündelik hayatı 
nasıl şekillendirdiği sorgulanmakta ve son olarak kent gündelik hayatının 
güvenlik siyasetindeki olası rolü araştırılmaktadır. Tez, hakim güvenlik 
anlayışlarının küreselleşme, neoliberal politikalar ve kentleşme gibi süreçlerin 
eşitsizlikleri ve çeşitli güvensizlikleri yeniden üreten bir şekilde, kentler 
üzerinden devamlılığını sağladığını tartışırken, devlet-merkezci yaklaşımları 
eleştirmeyi hedeflemektedir.  
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: uluslararası, kent mekanı, sınırlar, güvenlik, gündelik 
hayat, küresel şehir, küreselleşme, kentleşme 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Borders have been central both for the discipline of International Relations and 
its subject matter, the international. The way in which world was imagined and 
analysed as a space demarcated by state territorial borders provided IR with its 
field of inquiry: international relations (more precisely inter-state relations). 
This literal and figurative ‘mapping’ of the international by IR brought forward 
insecurities of which the sources were inter-state relations and territorial 
borders. In this sense, the state is not only taken as the centre of analysis of 
international relations, but it is presented as the most appropriate agent of the 
international and security. At the same time, the borders separating the ordered 
inside from the chaotic international have been assumed to be fixed, pre-given 
and linear by state-centred analysis of international relations that focused on 
inter-state relations and assumed the international as a distinct anarchical realm 
‘outside’ of the state. 
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The problematic of this thesis is primarily based on this mapping, this 
approach to borders and the understanding of security brought forward by these 
assumptions. Moreover, it is based on the role of understandings and politics of 
security in mapping and bordering the international. To inquire about this 
problematic, this thesis directs its attention towards the urban context. The 
problem of the thesis is the interaction between borders of the international and 
the city, and the role of security in this interaction especially after 1980s and 
the end of the Cold War. For that matter, it asks: How do the bordering of cities 
play in the construction of the international and its subjects through practices 
and understandings of (urban) security and insecurity?  
It is often claimed that more than half of the world’s population lives in 
urban areas, and that this will be 60% of the world’s population within the next 
two decades due to the speed of growth. The speed of the contemporary 
urbanization  and  urban  population  growth  are  agglomerating  higher  than  
ever  before  and  this growth is faster in  the  ‘developing’ parts of  the world 
(Abrahamsen et al., 2009; Wood, 2010). It is argued that what we witness is 
urbanization of the planet, thus urbanization is a “planetary condition” and we 
are entering the urban century (Brenner, 2009: 206). In addition to an 
unprecedented pace of growth, urban areas are witnessing severe insecurities 
and violence (Abrahamsen et al., 2009: 363). 
However, rather than pointing to a world divided between urban and 
non-urban, this urban growth is significant in terms of the processes involved 
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such as reorganization of urban space, globalization, neoliberalism and 
urbanization. The numbers may show that more and more people are affected 
by these processes. Yet, it is not the numbers that is crucial but the questions 
related to the urban space that comes to one’s mind: where the city begins and 
ends, who is included in the city and who is not, how one is not included, 
through which practices.  
Traditional mapping of the international that is based on the binaries of 
sovereignty/anarchy and inside/outside started to be questioned in 1980s 
(Ashley, 1988; Walker, 1993; Campbell, 1998). These criticisms were 
complemented by Critical Geopolitics studies which argued that borders are 
not fixed and pre-determined, but they are practices that constitute space and 
identities (Agnew, 1994). Later, critical approaches to borders decentred 
borders beyond state and pointed at different forms of bordering practices 
(Newman, 2001; Salter, 2004; Walters, 2006; Rumford, 2011; Amoore, 2011).  
After the end of the Cold War, with the acceleration of neoliberal 
globalization, internationalization of capital and free movement of money and 
labour indicated a transformation towards a borderless world for neoliberal 
approaches to IR. The imagination of the international with rigid territorial 
walls disagrees with this imagination of a borderless world. Building on the 
literature that approaches borders critically, this thesis attempts to go beyond 
this two-sided discussion and point towards the multiplicity and diffused 
character of borders through focusing on cities. 
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Firstly, by decentring borders beyond the state and including security 
professionals, bureaucrats, and experts as agents of bordering, these approaches 
make possible to look at cities as sites where borders of the international 
perform. Urban space has become a site of practices and part of the discourses 
through which the international and security are constructed. Urban in/security 
intertwined with other discourses of security – whether human, national, 
international and global security – is increasingly used by states, international 
governmental and non-governmental organizations, and MNCs. This happens 
mostly in a manner that has a tremendous cost upon some, while advantaging 
some others. 
Secondly, by decentring borders to include people as agents and the 
everyday as a site of bordering, these approaches make visible alternative 
imaginations of the international, hence an alternative politics of the 
international. This suggests that urban space is not just the site of the above 
mentioned discourses and practices, but also involve challenges to them. The 
alternatives can be found in the everyday lives of urban dwellers. This as well 
suggests the possibility of different understandings of security, hence an 
alternative politics of security.  
Making other bordering practices visible can bring other sources of 
insecurity experienced by urban dwellers to the forefront in the international 
politics of security and prioritize these insecurities over other sources of 
insecurity that are directed against states. In other words, decentring borders 
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can help decentring security through making visible other borders both as 
sources of insecurity and sources of resistance at the everyday. To put it more 
clearly, focusing on bordering practices other than the inter-state relations – 
such as between those who participate in the global economy through 
production and consumption and those who cannot – bring forward security 
practices within the city which protect and supply these borders. This argument 
suggests that the existing politics of security is a politics of bordering the city 
to ensure the sustainability of the global political economy. Security practices 
associated with planning, urbanization and urban warfare both in the so-called 
developed and developing parts of the world work for sustaining the conditions 
of global neoliberalism. In 1980s, in the developed world, end of Keynesianism 
and welfare policies brought to the eye the symptoms of already existing 
problems of socio-economic inequalities.  
In the developing world, this happened through structural adjustment 
programs, privatization, economic liberalization, and integration to the global 
economy. As the symptoms – the problems generated by the global politics of 
security and economy such as unemployment, homelessness, extreme poverty, 
increased crime rates and even terrorism – became more visible, these 
symptoms were treated as the source of the problems (or as the source of 
insecurities) and the solutions were directed against the symptoms rather than 
structural sources. With 9/11 and war on terror, this was strengthened rather 
than questioned. Moreover, politics of security became even more exclusionary 
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and violent, became legitimized by the threat of terrorism and came to be more 
and more a politics of bordering to sustain the global political economy in the 
face of such a symptom of its problematic nature.  
In this sense, decentring borders and focusing on borders within the city 
is not just essential in terms of representing security practices as (immediate) 
sources of insecurity, but it is essential because it brings forward the way these 
borders through security practices make possible the reproduction and survival 
of the existing global politics that generates insecurities.  
City’s significance for this analysis comes from its place in the global 
political economy. In most aspects, global political economy works through 
cities by means of urbanization, privatization and reorganization of urban 
space. City is where one can look for the agency of globalization. Then, city is 
where costs and consequences of these processes are most visible although 
these costs and consequences are generally treated as what causes insecurity 
rather than considered as insecurities themselves generated by wider processes. 
Through urban security practices inequalities become depoliticized and 
reproduced between and within cities both of the developed and developing 
world. Furthermore, politics of security work in a way that destroys any 
capacity for resistance and challenge to this reproduction and depoliticization. 
The city is where one’s everyday life interacts most with the international. This 
is more the case in a city that is integrated in the global economy and involved 
in globalization more. 
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However, city is as well a site where oppositions, challenges and 
resistance to these processes take place. As people in their everyday lives 
experience insecurities stemming from the politics of the international in the 
urban space, they are as well involved in these processes through challenging, 
resisting, negotiating, altering or reproducing. When one thinks in terms of 
borders of the international both as sources of insecurity and sources of 
resistance, it even seems strange that cities did not attract more attention from 
IR studies. 
In general terms, studying the city helps us to understand better the 
borders of the international, the relationship between ‘here’ and ‘there’, and the 
relationship between globalization and security. In doing this, by way of 
focusing on the everyday, this thesis aims to have a bottom-up approach to 
understand the relationship between city, security and the international. As the 
names of the chapters suggest, the thesis aims at rethinking the international as 
not just inter-state relations or as a space ‘outside’ the state, but as embedded 
within cities, rethinking security not as security of the city, of the nation-state, 
or of the international that is inclusionary but as securing the status quo, the 
international, the inequalities that the international is built upon through 
bordering cities so that the symptoms are targeted as sources of insecurity and 
the structural causes are depoliticized; rethinking the everyday urban life of 
people not as determined by the international but as actively being involved in 
the politics of security and the international. 
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For this end, Chapter 2 problematizes the state-centred and statist 
assumptions of IR and aims to decentre the borders of the international beyond 
the state. It asks how the borders of the international are constituted and 
secured through bordering cities. It argues that looking at the city – with its 
multiplicity of bordering practices and experiences of time and space – reveals 
the artificiality of binaries of global and local as well as the international and 
the everyday. Chapter 3 will analyse the existing politics of security of the city 
and how it operates through borders of the international while at the same time 
drawing those borders. In line with this, it will problematize the existing 
politics of security, whose security it is, and who borders the city. As 
globalizing processes, urban warfare, urban planning and design, and 
urbanization is taking place in cities everywhere, the argument is not limited to 
a certain part of the world (as developed or developing albeit with different 
experiences), but concerns cities that are integrated in the global political 
economy more. Chapter 3 as well illustrates how different cities are 
interconnected through their techniques of security. Several cities are discussed 
in terms of their practices and discourses of security and what brings them 
together is that with neoliberal globalization, hence privatization and 
liberalization, urban security practices become one of bordering the city to 
secure the existing relations of domination, colonialism, and inequality. 
Although it has a decentred understanding of borders, Chapter 3 is 
limited to the ways in which the everyday is shaped by security understandings 
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and practices of security professionals. This critique is a first step towards 
inquiring into the ways in which the everyday shapes security understandings 
and the possibility of a transformation towards a more inclusionary politics of 
(urban) security. 
In Chapter 4, then, the everyday is taken as an active site that inhabits 
the agents that do not only reproduce security logics that professionals of 
unease practice daily. It asks how these practices are experienced by urban 
dwellers and worked upon through their everyday life. It will question the 
extent to which everyday understandings and practices of security of the urban 
dwellers have a potentiality of transforming the existing politics of security 
towards more inclusionary lines based on co-existence, and that does not result 
in producing more insecurities, but that is rights and needs based. ‘The right to 
the city’ will be questioned as a basis upon which to build this alternative 
politics of security: ‘security within the city’.  
Looking at the local and the everyday of the urban dweller reveals 
different urban experiences, thus different imaginations of the city and helps 
questioning ‘whose city’, who gets to define and (re)border the city, and how. 
In turn, focusing on the everyday and experiences of non-professionals with 
different bordering practices makes possible a different imagination and 
politics of the international that goes beyond the binaries of global/local, 
national/international, inside/outside. As this thesis argues that globalization is 
not an outside force that determines everything else or simply ‘inside’, but 
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works through the inside. City is one site where the agency of globalization is 
centred. Thus, the everyday of the urban dweller can bring possibilities of 
resistance and alternatives to politics of security and the international to the 
forefront of International Relations. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
RETHINKING THE INTERNATIONAL 
 
 
 
The answer to the question of “what is the international?” given by the 
discipline of IR has been about territorially divided lines of sovereign states 
and the relations between them. Sovereign states have been central in the 
imagination of identity and space in the study of international relations. 
Through taking territorial space as the only order that diffuses identities and 
loyalties, i.e. as the only possible political space, international space has been 
imagined as the space of territorially divided sovereign states, falling into the 
“territorial trap” (Agnew, 1994). Thus, what influences most our answers to 
the questions of “what political life is and where it occurs” have been states 
(Walker, 1990: 6). For this understanding of the international, states being the 
natural and necessary actors, the problems that arose were never related to a 
problem with the state per se, but this or that state. Against this traditional 
understanding of international relations, there have been others who argued 
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“politics doesn’t fit into the neat boxes of sovereignty that the invocations of 
political space imply” (Dalby, 2005). The imagination of the global life 
provided by the traditional lens – mainly the realist lens – is criticized as being 
a narrow one as it assumes an anarchical world of black boxes of states 
inherently prone to war constantly.  
Acknowledging that the study of international relations is “a moral 
mapping of spaces and identities” (George, 1996), this chapter questions this 
mapping that traditional international relations has been providing, and looks 
into cities to inquire other identity construction and spatializing processes that 
create a “different and nonstatic planetary map” (Shapiro, 1996: 3). It is 
argued that understanding the city and how the borders of cities are 
constructed is crucial in reproducing ‘the international’ and its alternatives. 
The first part of the chapter asks what kind of a mapping traditional IR 
provides in which cities are “awkward” objects for studying international 
relations. This imagination of the international demarcated by the territorial 
state borders is problematized through arguments provided by critical 
approaches to IR. Building on this problematization and based on literatures 
such as Critical Geopolitics, Critical Border Studies and International Political 
Sociology, the second part of the chapter reconceptualises and de-centres 
borders as practices. This reconceptualization is necessary for an analysis of 
the mapping of the international through bordering of cities which is the task 
of the final part. 
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2.1. Borders of the International as State Territorial Boundaries 
  
‘Border’ as a concept has a specific role in IR. Between the two World Wars, 
when the first IR chair was found and when IR was separated from Political 
Science as a discipline, its main objective was to understand and inquire the 
ways to prevent inter-state war (Burchill and Linklater, 2013). The way two 
disciplines were separated pointed towards a separation of an inside and 
outside of the state and assumed the borders of the international as interstate 
borders. Political theory was to deal with state as the only site of politics 
leaving IR to deal with the occasions – diplomatic, military and strategic – 
between those states. 
This differentiation between inside state and outside inter-state relations 
as an anarchical realm can be found with most clarity in Martin Wight. He 
(1966) argued that international theory cannot use the “language” of political 
theory because that language is for political life, “normal relationships and 
calculable results”, and “good life” whereas international theory is about 
“survival” (1966: 33) seeking a “speculation about relations between states” 
(1966: 17) that consist of “recurrence and repetition” (1966: 26). Based on this 
differentiation between what is within states and between states, the 
international realm appears as a realm void of historical progress. Thus, for 
Wight, international theory “or what there is of it, is scattered, unsystematic 
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and mostly inaccessible to layman” (1966: 20). This understanding of 
international relations as an anarchical realm dominated the mainstream IR. 
Starting with the 1980s and with the end of the Cold War, the 
domination of the understanding that the international consisted of territorial 
state borders was shattered and critical voices could no longer be disregarded 
(to some extent). First criticisms were based on this spatial separation of inside 
and outside complemented with a hierarchization in terms of sovereignty and 
anarchy. Ashley (1988: 252) problematizes this anarchy problematique that 
lies at the heart of the discourse of international relations: construing inside as 
a “prior” realm against outside as an anarchical realm (1988: 252).   
For the sovereignty/anarchy dichotomy to work the differences within 
sovereign states should be repressed and converted to differences between 
sovereign states. Furthermore, for it to work, the domestic realm should be 
valorised as there lays the legitimate warrantor of identity, homogeneity and 
order, whereas the anarchical realm should be de-valorised as the realm of 
disorder, threat and heterogeneity. This hierarchical valorisation points 
towards representation of the sovereign entity as a ‘singular presence’, the 
domestic realm as stable and homogenous, and the realm beyond sovereignty 
as dangerous. As long as the representation of the inside – the sovereign 
identity – as a singular presence and as an homogenous space is naturalised 
and internalised, the dichotomy can survive (Ashley, 1988). Thus, the 
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dichotomy of sovereignty/anarchy both creates an inside, and orders, 
disciplines, silences and contains that inside. 
Walker, in a similar manner, problematized inside/outside dichotomy 
that not only points towards a “spatial ontology” of inside and outside but also 
a “temporal dualism” of history and progress within and “recurrence and 
repetition” beyond (1993). He argues that the spatial and temporal divide 
between inside and outside that can be seen in Wight’s articulation of 
international theory shapes our understandings of political space, thus here and 
there, and “what political community can be”, thus its “nature and location” 
(Walker, 1993: 62). Based on this dichotomy here lies politics, the possibility 
of progress and universality; there exists mere relations, particularity, 
strangeness and threats (Walker, 1990: 11-2; 1991: 456-7). What is not 
considered to be ‘of state’ is considered to be out of politics whether ‘inside’ 
or ‘outside’. Walker (1995a: 30) criticizes Wight’s understanding for 
rendering local politics “irrelevant” at the same time claiming that world 
politics cannot exist. State appears as the sole mediator between inside and 
outside. The “nature and location of political community” is answered through 
same divide prioritizing citizenship over any other alternative political 
community (Walker, 1993: 62). In this analysis, cities or city politics are 
irrelevant as they are part of local politics. Their study becomes less important 
for international relations compared to study of inter-state relations 
(Magnusson, 2011: 17). 
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This form of analysis of the international as the ‘outside’ of state 
borders, and international relations as interstate relations is interpenetrated with 
an imagination and mapping of the international as a territorially divided space. 
Not surprisingly, the main actor of this analysis and imagination becomes the 
state. As will be discussed in the following chapter, such an analysis can only 
realize insecurities that are inter-state, but disregard other sources of 
insecurities as unimportant or less urgent (Bilgin, 2010).  
States are not only taken as the main actor of the international, they are 
also given the primacy of being the most appropriate actor. The former, which 
is called state-centrism, is a “methodological choice” (Bilgin, 2008: 94). It is 
an “empirical justification” through the assumption that the states are the main 
actors of the international, and that is why they are the central figure of 
international relations theory (Wyn Jones, 1996: 199). The latter, which is 
called statism, is a “normative choice” (Bilgin, 2008: 94). The normative 
justification for state-centrism, hence the justification for statism, is that state 
represents the ideal way of articulating political space and identities, the only 
space where power and authority are exercised, an ideal agent which provides 
security for its citizens. State-centrism and statism reinforce each other. 
Through the empirical assumptions that take the state as fixed, trans-historical 
and homogenous, state-centrism is justified normatively representing state as 
the ideal agent of international relations and the ideal centre of power. In this 
line of thought, then, the discussion revolves around a unitary, autonomous 
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centre of power that governs almost all relationships (Campbell, 1996: 18). 
Moreover, the spatial mode of analysis provided by the dichotomy of 
inside/outside implies a level of analysis of sub-state and supra-state levels 
(Campbell, 1996: 9).  
 
As mainstream approaches faced with criticisms after the Cold War, 
they seemingly renewed their assumptions. Other levels of analysis were added 
after the end of the Cold War (Campbell, 1996) and non-state actors were 
acknowledged though only as unitary actors and black boxes (Bilgin, 2008a: 
95). Campbell is critical of the ways in which the problem of agency and actors 
is tried to be figured out by adding more levels of analysis such as local and 
global, or “something-national” (1996: 11). The levels are analysed as if 
separate, “autonomous practices” with little consideration of the relations 
between them and their conditions of possibility (Bigo and Walker, 2007: 728). 
Actors – be it state or non-state – are seen as prior to the relationships they are 
involved (Campbell, 1996: 11). Both for neo-realist and neo-liberal analysis, 
state remained to be the primary actor of world politics. 
However, the imagination of the international as territorially divided 
units with impervious borders was disrupted by flows. Especially after the Cold 
War, it is argued, state has less and less control over the flows whether across 
borders or within them (Alker, 1996: x). Those flows – whether peoples, 
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identity, or capital – are challenges to the mapping of the world based on states 
and the codes that are created as a result such as the First and the Third World, 
or Occident and Orient (Ferguson, 1996: 169). Thus, refugees, migrants, 
indigenous peoples, and the flows of ideas and images are considered to be 
challenges to the territorially demarcated imagination of the international that 
is state-centric (Shapiro, 1996; Soguk, 1996; Xenos, 1996). Their 
interconnections suggest a “spatial continuity” challenging “spatial 
fragmentation” (Soguk, 1996: 87-8) and state’s ordering of political space and 
identity (Xenos, 1996). Falk (1990) calls these flows nonterritorial ‘evasions’ 
that are across, within, and beyond boundaries. They are argued to be creating 
new loyalties and communities. Therefore, loyalties are not always in line with 
the territorial borders of the state but transcend them (Alker, 1996: x). 
Although principle of state sovereignty have dominated our political identities 
and understandings of ‘who we are’ prioritizing citizenship over any other 
alternative identity or loyalty including humanity (Linklater, 1982; Walker, 
1990: 12), this is under increasing challenge.  
Nevertheless, it is crucial to be wary of taking state territorial borders as 
its containers, as the only way in which state power is displayed (Shah, 2012). 
For instance, neo-liberal approaches to international relations argue that the 
world is becoming a borderless space as flows of capital, people and cultures 
move freely between states more and more. What is disregarded by this 
approach is other – perhaps more invisible – bordering practices. Since 
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physical walls and territorial borders are not the only spatialising practices of 
states, their being undermined by flows does not necessarily mean fading state 
power or sovereignty. There are other ways of maintaining sovereignty claims 
and reasserting control (Shapiro, 1996; Brown, 2010). Spatial dividing lines are 
the most visible form of sovereignty practices of the state rendering the Other 
as “alien and dangerous” (Soguk, 1996: 286). Through strengthening territorial 
walls and other boundary practices whether physical, technological or 
“imaginative” (Soguk, 1996: 286), state continues its quest for hindrance of the 
challenges to its sovereignty, its domination over ways of living, thinking, and 
identity and space making. These practices reveal the contradictions with the 
neoliberal assumption of a borderless world. The eagerness of states for 
building walls go against the desire for “a world without borders” shared by 
almost all political tendencies (Brown, 2010). One example is norms of 
“human rights and cosmopolitanism” spread across Western democracies on 
the one hand, and “the closed nationalism and rise of institutional racism” on 
the other (Bigo, 2003: 112). This is a contradiction seen in the EU’s migration 
policies as well between its “fatalist externalization policies” and “commitment 
to uphold the global protection regime” (Bilgiç, 2013: 123).  
The traditional understanding of borders suggests a role for borders as 
stopping the threat to trespass ‘inside’. However, if one considers transnational 
non-state threats, these borders seem impractical (Brown, 2010: 21). For 
instance, as many studies on migration show, harsher border policies and 
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stronger and taller walls do not result in decreased number of immigrants, but 
increased number of immigrants who are labelled as illegal, a more difficult 
and dangerous transit including death and getting cheated by the smugglers 
(Brown, 2010: 91; Soguk, 1996: 302). Then, why states seem to be so eager to 
build taller and stronger walls? Brown’s (2010: 91) answer is that walls seem 
to be “nothing more than spectacularly expensive political gestures, sops to 
certain constituencies, signs of what distresses but cannot be contained”. By 
building walls and strengthening their borders, states almost create an effigy of 
themselves which resonates a “theatrical play” with the state as the ‘leading 
role’ making a spectacle of its power (Brown, 2010). This quest is a reaction to 
the contestation of state’s sovereignty over borders and display state’s desire 
for holding onto its powers over guarding, containment, and ‘fortifying’. In a 
similar manner, Soguk (1996: 300) wrote:  
In many ways, the border is an embellished, enhanced spectacle that 
serves to undergird existing myths as to impervious and homogeneous 
“culture/nation gardens” or to create new ones. 
 
As long as IR continues to take borders as pre-given and as the fixed territorial 
limits of the sovereign power, it can be thought as a “particular though 
powerful discourse of identity politics” which always puts state at the centre 
of its analysis as the sole claimer of organizing identity even at times of a 
challenge against this dominance (Campbell, 1996: 19). This in turn 
constitutes a particular way of imagining the international. In order to 
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challenge this particular imagination it is essential to problematize boundaries 
whether disciplinary, physical or of identity. This necessitates problematizing 
the way we think about borders. A critique of the way in which the 
international is imagined as a world that is territorially demarcated by borders 
does not necessarily mean a dismissal of the borders and arguing for a 
borderless world. Both ways, it becomes an “essentialisation”: “an 
essentialisation of a world divided among nation-states” or “an essentialisation 
of a world in which the international has been erased by” (Bigo and Walker, 
2007: 730). It turns to a discussion of presence or absence: “Boundaries are 
either here or they are not. State sovereignty is either here or it is being 
replaced by something vaguely global, or cosmopolitan” (2007: 730). As 
presented below, analysis of borders and the international is much more 
complex than this ‘here or not’ discussion provides. A different understanding 
of the border as a concept is necessary for an analysis of borders of the 
international within the city. 
 
 
2.2. Borders of the International as Practice 
 
After the end of the Cold War, building upon the primary criticisms towards 
traditional approaches, disciplines of Political Science and International 
Relations started to question their geographical assumptions that led them into 
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a ‘territorial trap’ (Agnew, 1994). Those assumptions can be summarized as: 
“reification of state territorial spaces as fixed units of secure sovereign space”, 
“division of the domestic from the foreign”, and taking “territorial state as 
existing prior to and as a container of society” (Agnew, 1994: 77). 
Questioning the relationship between state, territory, space and power, and 
how we think of them, critical geopolitics problematize – whether explicit or 
implicit – geographical assumptions that are taken as facts and natural (Agnew 
and Corbridge, 1995; Dalby, 1991; Ó Tuathail, 1996; Ó Tuathail and Agnew, 
1992; Ó Tuathail and Dalby, 1998; Ó Tuathail et al., 2006). A critical 
geopolitical analysis decentres our understandings of power and spatiality 
beyond the state and territory. It does not take spatiality as fixed and natural 
and takes space-making as a practice that goes beyond the state territory and 
beyond the state as well. Subjectivity and identity construction becomes 
decentred as well since identity-making and subjectivity-constructing practices 
beyond the state are made visible.  
It is argued that the fixed and stable physical borders of states are an 
outcome of its search for “fixing political problems in a carceral landscape 
where everything and every person has their place” (Dalby, 2005: 432) and 
“freezing” flows and cultures in ‘settled’ spaces with settled borders 
(Ferguson, 1996: 170). However, these problems move without stopping at the 
borders. As an example of the invalidity of the fixed problems and politics 
confined in fixed boundaries, Dalby points to the increased immigration to the 
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urban areas for having a chance to take part in the global economy. Effects of 
this are not restricted with where the migration occurs. Failing to stop them at 
the physical borders, new borders are drawn. Mapping practices are not 
limited to the physical borders, but there is a “plurality of boundaries” (Bigo, 
2003: 97). Although flows such as migration signal the weakness of the 
physical territorial state borders, other practices of inclusion and exclusion – 
such as ‘safe third country’ agreements – perform their role (Nyers, 2003: 
1070). This is particularly the case with the EU and its border control 
mechanisms of externalization (Bilgiç, 2013: 111-126).  
Being scattered across spaces, the (re)mapping practices take place on 
an everyday basis and signal the blurred lines between inside and outside, 
police and military, criminal and enemy (Bigo, 2003; Ingram and Dodds, 
2009). Those practices are justified as a means for security of “a particular 
vision of the homeland” (Ingram and Dodds, 2009: 10) or “liberal 
globalization” (2). Brown (2010: 19-20) gives several examples to the 
practices of inclusion and exclusion other than the state borders: the increasing 
number of gated communities in the cities of US near Mexican border, walls 
within Jerusalem with the walls around its Museum of Tolerance, Via Anelli 
Wall built in the city of Padua to demarcate the city between citizens and 
immigrants and walls built by US in Iraq such as the Baghdad Wall. 
A focal point of analysis for critical geopolitics is geographical 
assumptions behind binaries of East/West, North/South, and 
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developed/underdeveloped. The traditional understanding that borders and 
foreign policy represent a pre-existing state identity has been turned upside 
down. Foreign policy practices are boundary making practices that construe 
the dichotomies of inside/outside and the state identity (Campbell, 1998). In 
this understanding then, neither borders nor state (identity) is taken as fixed or 
pre-given. Thus, the state which is constructed through practices of statecraft 
is scrutinized as well. Bordering practices within cities can only become 
visible through such a radical change in the way borders are understood: as 
constructs rather than fixed territorial walls.  
Critical border studies and International Political Sociology directed 
their attention to borders which are considered as practices that form 
subjectivities and identities. What is crucial with bordering is its multiplicity. 
On the one hand, bordering practices can be “social, spatial and political 
constructs” (Newman, 2001: 139). They are not only at the territorial limits of 
the sovereign state, but can be in the form of planning, architecture, 
technologies of surveillance, discursive barriers and identity fences. Then, 
borders are not simple lines. They are increasingly “non-geographical”, “non-
territorial”, and “non-linear” (Walters, 2006: 145). Moreover, borders do not 
have singular meanings for different people or groups. This unequal character 
of borders means that a point of transit may mean barrier for others (Balibar, 
2002). It may be explicitly political for some, such as those that are 
marginalized, whereas depoliticized for others such as the “kinetic elite” 
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(Salter, 2008: 377). It may be “invisible to the majority” while highly visible 
for others (Rumford, 2011: 68). This unequal character of borders points 
towards the functions of bordering. Bordering practices do not inherently 
mean stopping or blocking. Rather they “produce and distribute both mobility 
and immobility”. Bordering functions as a way of governing “conducted in 
and through movement itself” (Amoore, 2011: 64). This is reflected in some 
cases in the attempts of making borders “smart” not “impassable” (Salter, 
2004).  
Nevertheless, it is important to underscore that bordering practices 
transcend the state. This means that (re)bordering practices – a term used by 
Andreas (2000) – are diffused and scattered across space, performed by 
different actors such as security professionals in their daily practices. For an 
understanding of the borders that is not state-centred, Rumford (2011: 68) 
argues that one should “see like a border”, recognize the ubiquity of borders in 
everyday life, be aware of the invisibility of some borders for the majority, and 
acknowledge bordering practices other than the frontiers of nation-state. It is, 
after all, not just the authorities or professionals that do bordering. Citizens, 
non-citizens, NGOs, groups, and individuals engage in bordering practices as 
well (Rumford, 2011: 67). For some activist groups, such as ‘No one is illegal’ 
network, borders are constitutive of a part of their identity (Rumford, 2006: 
165). Different people or groups’ “struggle for life-space” in the city consist of 
 
 
26 
 
different bordering practices (Öncü and Weyland, 1997: 11). In “The Time of 
the City”, Shapiro (2010: 10-11) wrote:  
Within the urban milieu, there are (among others) two politically 
charged dynamics at play in the city’s partitioning: separations/barriers 
continually maintained by policing agents and events of repartitioning 
enacted by counter-agents – individuals and groups involved in 
financial schemes, survival strategies, politicization and 
subjectification. 
 
Most common words used for cities such as ‘milieu’, ‘contact zones’, 
and ‘city as crossroads’ imply endless practices of bordering by different 
actors. For example, urban planning as a form of bordering practice has long 
been assumed to be the work of officials and urban planners working in tandem 
with governments. However, ordinary people are also engaged in urban 
planning. They transform their environment; change the very usage and 
meaning of urban infrastructure. Since it is assumed that the place that is not 
occupied by the state is an empty or vacant space, those who engage in such 
acts are considered “informal actors” with their “informal actions” (Calhoun et 
al., 2013: 197). These actions, however, do not have to be in direct opposition 
to the officials. At times, those practices that (re)make the city take place 
through “negotiation and dialogue” (Mack, 2013: 157). There are also those 
who find their own way of protecting their neighbourhood from outsiders with 
their own devices such as those ‘illegal’ residents of Maputo in Mozambique 
who have developed their own surveillance system monitoring the 
neighbourhood (Krause, 2013: 237). 
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Bordering practices of actors other than the state is made visible 
through this different understanding of borders discussed in this section. 
Bordering practiced daily by security professionals is interlinked with a certain 
understanding of security and forms a certain politics of security as will be 
discussed in Chapter 3. Moreover, bordering practices at the everyday life-
space beyond the state and official authorities are made visible as well. This 
makes possible to inquire the potential of a different understanding of security, 
hence a different politics of security (which will be the aim of Chapter 4).  
This discussion of a different understanding of borders as practices or 
as constructs that constitutes and shapes identities, loyalties, belongingness, 
friends and enemies reveal borders other than the territorial walls. The next 
part focuses on the city as a border space that demarcates an inside from an 
outside (cutting across territorial state borders) and questions the ways in 
which bordering the city interacts with the international.  
 
 
2.3. Borders of the International and the City 
 
Thus far the discussion has revolved around rethinking the international 
beyond its imagination in terms of territorially demarcated state borders, 
reconceptualising and de-centring borders in terms of practices and processes. 
This makes possible to question the role of bordering of cities in the 
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imagination and mapping of the international. In fact, cities have long been a 
part of the political imaginary – long before the states – whether in terms of 
public space, city-republic or urban environment representing “a social and 
symbolic structure, a place of security or insecurity, of freedom or violence” 
(Abrahamsen et al., 2011: 365). The organization of cities has changed in the 
long duration. Medieval city as a fortress was “a policy of defense by its very 
existence” (Shapiro and Neaubauer, 1990: 109).  
For Shapiro and Neaubauer (1990), modern city is a policy as well, but 
this time a policy of sustaining the global economy. Thus, according to them 
“what is modern to the city is its placement within the global economy” (1990: 
109). However, this does not mean a division of labour in terms of security 
and economy between state and city. Although cities are not fortified in the 
way they used to be, protecting those inside from outside, other ‘walls’ 
perform within and across cities (Shapiro, 2009). Thus, the main assumption 
may be that states have the monopoly over security and violence leaving the 
role of sustaining global economy to cities. However, the two areas cannot be 
separated neatly as this assumption suggests. 
Curtis (2011) makes an analogy between the international system and 
global networked cities arguing that issues such as inequality, disparity, forms 
of centrality and periphery that are existent in the international system are now 
existent in the global cities through “global networked forms”. The 
implications of this, he argues, can be both violence and authoritarianism, or 
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tolerance and cosmopolitan sensibility. He argues that if IR wants to 
understand how the international system is changing, where it needs to direct 
its attention is global cities and the relationship between cities and states. The 
relationship between cities and states, and the role of cities in the global 
economy does not suggest the decline of state; on the contrary it suggests that 
cities are crucial for states’ existence in the global political economy. 
However, at the same time, global cities are said to “become key sites of 
political contestation, amplifying both systemic contradictions and historical 
possibilities” (Curtis, 2011: 1945). More importantly, cities are sites of 
conflicts, borderings, fragmentations, zones of contemporary wars, colonial 
practices, etc. as will be discussed in the next chapter. Borders of the 
international are constituted through such practices. 
The dominant politics of the international works through both a 
temporal and spatial form of bordering. In other words, the international is 
constituted through not just spatial boundaries or spatializing, but through 
temporal boundaries or temporalizing as well. In addition to the spatial binary 
of traditional international relations, Walker (2006a, 2006b) adds a temporal 
one between the modern international and its other: “The international 
expresses a theory of temporality and history (‘modernization’) before it 
expresses a theory of spatiality and territoriality (‘anarchy’)” (2006b: 78). 
Demarcation in this sense is not just a spatial one between friend and foe, 
inside and outside, but a temporal one distinguishing between the modern 
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system of states and the non-modern, uncivilized, barbaric others outside of 
the international. Between friend and foe the consequences of anarchical 
system can be tackled through diplomatic relations, but the outside of the 
modern international (state system) does not even qualify for this mediation. 
This demarcation thus constitutes both the boundaries of the state and the state 
system/international order (2006a; 2006b). This double demarcation is called 
‘double outside’ by Walker (2006a). He (2006a: 59) wrote: 
Yet it is important to keep in mind that the limits of modern political 
life are articulated not only at the territorial boundaries of the modern 
state, as almost all modern critical political analysis has tended to 
assume, but at the boundaries of the modern international, even though 
it is far from clear where, or when, these boundaries are supposed to 
be. 
 
With this double demarcation comes the question what/who is excluded from 
the international, constituted as not being brought into modernity or modern 
subjectivity. Walker (2006a: 68) gives the example of the relations between 
‘East’ and ‘West’ during the Cold War as a spatial demarcation between friend 
and foe, and the relations between ‘North’ and ‘South’ as a temporal 
demarcation between civilized and barbarian. First set of relations constitute 
the international, whereas the second is between the modern international and 
the non-modern/immature.  Along these lines international relations cannot be 
synonymous with world politics or humanity as a whole and to claim the 
contrary has become more difficult. Moreover, these borderings – spatial and 
temporal – are becoming indistinguishable and inseparable; territorial borders 
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do not overlap with them most of the time. They transgress territorial borders, 
and this thesis argues, urban spaces: cities are home to millions of who are 
constituted outside the modern international. 
Bauman (2004) draws an analogy between industrial waste and waste as 
human lives. He talks about this category of ‘wasted humans’ in terms of 
outsiders and the unwanted ‘within’. Urban ghettoes are sites where this 
‘redundant’ population is left. Ghettoes used to give a feeling of home to those 
belonged to them, a chance of social inclusion. It was inhabitants’ practice of 
bordering as well and not just those who ‘separated’ them. This was especially 
the case in the American black ghettoes. Now, however, ghetto space has 
become a “dumping site” and a site for locking-down of the poor (Bauman, 
2004: 80-1). Compared to the American ones, ghettoes in Europe are not 
ethnically homogenous sites. There, waste is not produced within but 
“imported” (Bauman, 2004). They are inhabited by immigrants mostly. It is 
argued that this makes European ghettoes even more subject to bordering 
through exclusionary security practices. 
Therefore, those unwanted in the city may be outsiders that crossed the 
borders and came from somewhere else – as in the case of immigrants in 
general. At the same time, they might be already ‘inside’. Those created as 
‘waste’ might not be moving to somewhere else and become migrants, but may 
become outsiders within. 
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What ‘waste’ signifies is not just an inability of sustaining one’s life in 
economic terms, but a social exclusion, an inability of biological and social 
survival at once (Bauman, 2004). Urban masses become superfluous and 
unwanted as they are not part of global economy in terms of production, and 
more importantly, in terms consumption. In this way, their experiences and 
understandings of security become irrelevant as will be discussed in the 
following chapters. 
Then, relationship of the city to the global economy is significant in 
bordering the city. Although both ‘global city’ and neoliberal approaches are 
centred on globalization of world economy, global city approaches, which 
focus on the place of cities in the global economy, challenge the borderless 
world imaginary provided by neoliberal approaches to international relations. 
Whereas the latter argue that globalization erases the borders of the 
international, the former reveals different borders created because of the 
specific place of cities in the global economy. Two of the pioneer texts of 
global city literature, Friedmann and Wolff (1982) and Friedmann (1986) 
suggest that several core cities have a crucial role in shaping the global 
economy of which they are a part of. Some cities with sectors that control the 
global economy have an upper hand in the hierarchy of world cities.  
However, Sassen (1991) argues, global cities are not simply in 
competition with each other, but they are part of a system of global economy 
through a division of labour among cities. This division of labour signifies a 
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change within cities. Whereas the former industrial cities become post-
industrial cities with development of sectors of services and finance, their 
centres become gentrified thus made attractive to the business circles. This 
results in verticalized central business districts. The international elites of 
these global cities form a bordered space different than the national borders. 
This new bordered space necessitates developing the information and 
communication infrastructure that connects these parts of global cities whereas 
“the immediate environment” can be left without “upgrading” (Sassen, 2007: 
230-1). 
Castells (1996) focuses on a different spatial imagination that comes 
through “space of flows”. For him, infrastructure and social ties that a network 
of global cities indicates result in loyalties different than those to the nation 
state. This creates transnational identities. Plus, in a network society time does 
not move sequentially, but it is dissolved. He calls this “timeless time” of 
which the structure is simultaneity.  
Drawing on Castells’ work, Taylor (2003) attempts to categorize world 
city networks by measuring certain aspects of their producer services. Taylor 
does not assume city networks as bounded entities and analyses the 
relationship between globalization and cities – ‘globalizing cities’ – rather 
than a fixed category of the global city. However, he looks primarily and 
solely on economic factors and economic relations between cities as 
determiners of urban conditions. Taylor and his colleagues (Richard G. Smith 
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and Jon Beaverstock) from Loughborough University formed the 
Globalization and World Cities Research Network (GaWC) in 1998 where 
they issued bulletins measuring and categorizing global cities “based upon 
their level of advanced producer services” (GaWC Research Bulletin 5, 1999). 
Although not based on solely economic criteria as the GaWC, many other 
indexes and surveys were formed and issued later in the second half of 2000s. 
Some examples are Global Cities Index, Global Economic Power Index, 
Global Power City Index, the Wealth Report, and Global City 
Competitiveness Index. They measure, compare and categorize cities’ quality 
of life, capacities for interaction and relations with other cities, for influencing 
global decisions, and attracting investment. In a way, these indexes compare 
and categorize cities’ ‘global-ness’ or ‘world city-ness’. 
The processes these studies highlight in the formation of global cities 
are urban crises of late 1960s, economic restructuring of 1970s, development 
of MNCs, deindustrialization and the revolutions in communication and 
information technologies in the 1990s. These processes signalled increasing 
privatization of public services and spaces, liberalization, de-industrialization 
of formerly industrial cities and their economic transition towards service 
sectors rather than manufacturing. These processes cause polarization of the 
city, increasing inequalities within and between cities, and gaps of access to 
digital technology between groups of people in the city which are mostly taken 
as corporate elite and low-paid labour. Global cities or world cities are taken as 
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a new urban from and posited as the backbone of globalization which is 
understood mostly in economic terms. Thus, the city once again – as it was in 
the past – has an important place in the political imaginary and the imagination 
of the international.  
David Harvey as well posits central role for cities in the ongoing 
globalization of economy. He argues that with the latest stage of capitalism we 
see “annihilation of space by time” which is a new spatiotemporal experience 
called “the condition of postmodernity” (1989). Cities are places where space 
is annihilated by time through neoliberalism wiht the advent of information 
and communication technologies. In other words, this “time-space 
compression” is a result of technological innovation which is itself required by 
global capitalism. Harvey gives a temporal account of globalization by placing 
it in a later stage of capitalism that intensifies through time (Oke, 2009: 313). 
It is in this later stage that time and space is compressed. Capitalism moves to 
this stage by its inner logic. It necessitates to get rid of spatial barriers while 
keeping place differences (Oke, 2009: 314). Thus, Harvey posits capitalism 
with a singular logic and with a capacity of determining space and time. This 
means taking urban regions as bounded entities with a singular inherent logic 
(Painter, 2008: 350-351). He posits global and local as two separate and 
distinct realms that are in competitive relationship. Local is either determined 
by the global (economic superstructure) or it exists when resisting to the 
 
 
36 
 
global, but it can never be constituting it. In this binary, local is where the 
culture and identity politics exist (Smith, 2001).  
The role of city in this process is a tool for this shaping, site of the 
workings of the global – read as the global economy – in which space is fixed 
in this postmodern age. Urban politics is then about these policies of global 
capitalism, a tool for the continuation and survival of capitalist logic. Role of 
the local in this process is being global’s other. It is where one turns her/his 
face in an escape from the global. For Harvey local consists our roots (Smith, 
2001: 27) and our differences, as opposed to borderless global where “space is 
annihilated by time” thus making space inessential. It is the site of identity 
politics, a fixed site existing as a reaction to the global. Agency of social 
change is attributed to capitalism which is not taken as a context but as an 
historical agent (Smith, 2001). Cities are where the acts of this agent are 
concentrated spatially. Neither cities nor its inhabitants are assumed to have 
agency other than reactionary. They are not subjects but objects of this 
capitalist postmodern world, conditioned by it. Plus, the state is also an object 
or a lesser an agent in the sense that it only struggles without autonomy in 
globalized economy. In light of these arguments, it is argued that Harvey 
places a specific experience of time and space as universal since it is 
determined by a singular logic of capitalism in its latest stage. Others’ 
experiences or others’ role in this particular experience of time-space 
compression are invisible in Harvey’s account. 
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This dualistic understanding of global and local is evident in the above 
mentioned studies of the global city. Global is assumed to be a dynamic 
developed space driven by capitalism’s logic that exists for and by itself, 
whereas local is assumed to be as a static and underdeveloped place that either 
gets shaped by the global or reacts to it (Smith, 2001; Oke, 2009). As 
discussed at the beginning of this chapter, this is what traditional IR is 
criticized for as well in terms of adding other levels or scales without 
questioning their interrelationships and conditions of possibility and keeping a 
state-centred lens to understand phenomena.  
This form of analysis informs a mapping of the international based on 
a bounded understanding of space as divided between the global space of 
global cities and Others (including the local). It forces a dichotomy of inside 
as global city space and outside as everything else. What is left on the outside 
seems to be a blank canvas in this narrative (Öncü and Weyland, 1997) and 
other cities do not exist in this mapping.  
For this dualistic understanding, actors that belong to the global – 
transnational capitalist class, high-waged professionals and firms – are 
products of global capitalism, whereas actors that belong to the local – class 
movements, subaltern class, immigrants, disadvantaged and low-wage 
unskilled labour, and grassroots – exist as reactionary to the global economy. 
Then, agency belongs to the global (economy) acting upon the inactive realm 
of the local (Smith, 2001). State’s role in the relationship between these two 
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realms is a transformed one, a negotiated one that leaves state with less 
autonomy than before (Sassen, 2008). This “denationalization” occurred due 
to globalization and the insufficiency of state in the face of such globalization 
of economy (Sassen, 2008). Sassen takes spatial change in the logic of 
economic activities as the condition of possibility of this denationalization 
(Oke, 2013: 320). This rescaling means a new relationship between city and 
state in which the cities or city-regions are the bedrock of the organization of 
global economy. 
However, imagination of the global, hence local, is still a territorially 
informed one ordered in relation to state. Challenging state territorial borders 
is assumed to be a decrease in state power. As long as challenging borders is 
directly associated with decline of state power, territory becomes reified as 
ordering worlds, “as the presumed framework of political order” (Shah, 2012: 
58). For Shah (2012) this makes most of the studies on globalization fall into 
territorial trap. In this sense, global is assumed as a space above state whereas 
local is assumed as a place below state. 
Moreover, in spatial terms, the global tends to be taken as the Western 
space that acts upon the Rest. Temporally, global cities tend to be defined in 
terms of their global-ness, modern-ness and postmodern-ness measured in 
terms of a temporal trajectory of globalization that is of the Western 
experience. This mapping informed by the global city concept, then, 
disregards and erases the ways modernity – albeit appearing as if global and 
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universal – is constituted through both spatial differentiation and temporal 
development (King, 1995: 113-114). To put it more clearly, whereas now is 
modern compared to a past, it is here that is modern but not there as well. 
Here read as the West, non-West in this relationship belongs to a past and only 
exist through its reaction to the West (Oke, 2009: 323). Through this 
temporalization and spatialization, a later stage gets to be categorized as 
postmodern, and in terms of cities this becomes an association of emergence 
of global cities with the postmodern era (King, 1995: 117). Agency of the non-
West is negated and made invisible, whereas an understanding of modernity is 
reified as universal.  
One example of this temporal and spatial Eurocentrism is the way 
cities are measured according to a set of criteria set by taking a city as global 
(King, 1997; Ong, 2011). However, if one used different criteria, those cities 
that are considered as non-modern could be more modern than those 
considered as modern (King, 1997). What is more to the point is that, contrary 
to the criteria against which regions and cities are measured, there are cities 
that have their own experiences and ways of being ‘global’ as a process and 
art rather than “established criteria of city achievements” (Ong, 2011: 3). 
Looking at several Asian cities, Ong (2011) finds different ways of being 
global, namely “modeling”, “inter-referencing” and “new solidarities”, which 
are experienced and experimented by those cities. These different “styles of 
being global” suggest going beyond binary mappings of “rich/poor, 
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metropolitan/postcolonial”, but recognize interconnections and diversity of the 
actors and practices involved (2011: 9). 
In conclusion, the mapping that is provided by the concept of global 
city which focuses on global economy and cities is not so different than the 
traditional mapping provided by IR. Their actors and dichotomous levels are 
ordered in relation to the state which appears as the mediatory between their 
similar binaries of global-local and international-everyday, hence ‘here’ and 
‘there’.  Plus, these binaries are related to another binary of West and the Rest 
through which the former is made into the main agent of history. Through this 
binary, what is overlooked is “the mutual constitution and interaction” 
(Barkawi and Laffey, 2006; Rumelili, 2009: 45), “centuries of give and take 
between the two” (Bilgin 2009: 339) and “chains of elective affinities” (Pasha, 
2006). In this manner, being highly dependent upon the experiences of a 
particular part of the world – the West – and a particular group of people – 
elite men – traditional understanding of international relations worked for 
some, while silencing others (Bilgin, 2010a; 2010b). However, this is not a 
matter of overlooking or disregarding other experiences which can be solved 
by adding them to the literature, but a matter of constituting “both the 
discipline and of subjects and objects of security in different parts of the 
world” through “silencing” them (Bilgin, 2010b: 616).  
One of way of overcoming this silencing is to look into the time and 
space of the city: the “now time(s) of the city” as called by Shapiro (2010). 
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Adopting Mbembe’s arguments on time as lived (2001) and Lefebvre’s 
arguments on abstract and concrete space (1991), Shapiro argues that looking 
at the everyday, the multiplicity of time and space of the urban dweller makes 
possible a more critical agency. The (now) time(s) of the city reveal time and 
space’s multiplicity. It is the time that is “lived experience”, time of 
“existence” and “entanglement” as opposed to the abstract “unified World 
Historical time” that is chronological (Mbembe, 2001: 8, 16; Shapiro, 2010: 
28, 39). It is the space that is concrete, experienced and “created by the 
productive activities of people in their everyday lives” that is open to 
encounters and resistance as opposed to abstract (official) space that is 
intolerant to heterogeneity and counter-practices of production of space 
(Shapiro, 2010: 38).  
The now time(s) of the city brings the possibility of political resistance 
and negotiation into the forefront of the imagination and mapping of the 
international that is based on the reorganization of urban space. As opposed to 
taking globalization as an outside factor affecting the ‘inside’, such an analysis 
points towards the interaction between different practices of bordering within 
and across cities through processes of urbanization, neoliberalism and 
colonialism which will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter in 
their relation to politics of security. This is a first step towards situating the 
possibility of a different imagination and mapping of the international through 
a different politics of security which will be the subject of Chapter 4. 
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2.4. Conclusion 
 
This chapter dealt with the question of in what ways we can rethink the 
international through looking at the city. Firstly, the contradictions and basic 
assumptions of traditional IR were laid down. In this sense, these sets of 
questions were at the background of the first part: what makes the state most 
appropriate actor? Is the territorially demarcated, sovereignty-oriented 
international relations theory the best way to understand the international? Is 
the state the only identity-making actor, or only mediator between “global” and 
“local”, here and there? 
In the second part, problematization of borders was moved further 
through discussions provided by critical approaches that take border as a 
practice. It is argued that it is not only professionals that engage in bordering 
practices. It is essential to look at people, alongside the authorities and 
intellectuals; popular alongside the formal and practical; alternatives and 
challenges alongside the official and scholarly discourses. As borders cannot 
be analysed through a simple ‘here or not’ question, at the background of this 
part was the questions of ‘where the borders are’, ‘who does the bordering’, 
and ‘what borders do’. 
In the final part, these questions are diverted to the city space. Borders 
of the international cut across cities through urbanization, globalization, 
neoliberalism, colonialism, de-territorialization and re-territorialization. In this 
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sense, city is a border area. By way of acknowledging that this border area is a 
site of social struggle, different experiences of the city reveals different 
imaginations of it, and alternative politics of bordering. These processes that 
border the city work through practices of security. Chapter 3 now will question 
the interlinkage between the existing politics of security and bordering of the 
city.  
However, the answer to why we need to rethink the international in the 
first place, especially through the city, is not limited with making sense of the 
international. What is more is the possibility of alternatives, the possibility of 
change. In this sense, looking at the everyday of the city dweller is crucial for 
questions of agency and opening a space for resistance. This is, however, the 
subject of Chapter 4. 
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CHAPTER 3  
 
 
RETHINKING SECURITY 
 
 
 
The previous chapter discussed what border means for the international and 
how borders of the international are drawn – or practiced – in and through the 
city space. This chapter aims to analyse the relationship of these practices of 
bordering to politics of security. It asks how the existing policies of security 
border the city, and questions what ‘security of the city’ is. Security of the city 
is problematized through a critique of the existing security understandings and 
policies of professionals and experts of security and urban planning both in the 
‘developed’ and ‘developing’ world. 
The first part of the chapter deals with how security studies engage with 
the concept of security. The questions asked by these approaches are essential 
to answer what security is. The second part focuses on security practices which 
are bordering the city. Several themes are city’s role in warfare, destruction of 
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city space as a form of destruction of resistance and difference, urban planning 
as a form of securitization of the urban space, a politics of security that 
culminates in a war on the poor, and development as a form of exclusion. It is 
argued that these practices and understandings border the city, and – through 
leaving some outside of the city – exclude them from the political community.  
These practices are examined through the questions that are provided by 
security studies. My main questions for this aim are what security of the city is, 
what security of the city does and how security of the city is done. While 
giving these answers, this chapter focuses on professionals of security and their 
practices. However, as the general objective of the thesis is to explore a 
potential for change, the discussion continues in the following chapter to 
pluralize the answers given to these questions of security. 
 
 
3.1. Security Studies 
 
This chapter does not aim to broaden the security agenda to include issues of 
urban security into the area of security. Rather the aim is to direct attention 
towards a change in the security agenda with different priorities: more 
specifically, a change towards taking the human (or the urban dweller) and 
their experiences at the centre of the security agenda. This move is based on a 
critique of the traditional approaches to security; and its primary and basic 
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assumption is based on an understanding of security provided by critical 
approaches: security is not an objective truth but issues are constructed as 
security issues.  
Traditional approaches to security took security as an objective truth 
that is out there whether it is acknowledged by actors or not. It is important to 
note that pluralization of insecurities is acknowledged by these approaches as 
well. However, what differentiates them from more critical approaches is that 
the object to which those threats are directed is still the state for the traditional 
ones. Although it is acknowledged that security threats of this era is multiplied, 
broadened to include issues such as terror, migration, human-trafficking, drug-
trafficking, transnational crimes, environmental degradation and epidemics, the 
referent object of security remains the same (Bilgin, 2004). Plus, with more 
security threats, it is still the state that has the monopoly of dealing with 
insecurities. Therefore, statism and state-centrism that is a big part of the 
discipline of International Relations is evident in security studies as well. State 
has been accorded the role of being the main provider of security and the sole 
legitimate perpetrator of violence. This consequently makes state’s place both 
in Security Studies and IR a primary one.  
However, both capability and practices of states in terms of these 
responsibilities have been questioned. It is argued that states fail to provide 
security for their citizens, and at the same time, become the source of 
insecurity themselves for their own citizens to whom they claim to be 
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responsible for providing security (Alker, 1996: x; Wyn Jones, 1996: 203). 
Others – non-citizens – who are not included in state’s responsibility, or even 
worse, who are represented as threats face other insecurities. With the end of 
the Cold War, or even as early as late 1970s and early 1980s, this traditional 
understanding of statist and military oriented international security started to be 
criticized heavily (Booth, 1997: 85; Bilgin, Booth & Wyn Jones, 1998).  
The primary objection to the traditional approaches was the 
understanding of security as constituted rather than being an objective truth. 
Buzan et al. (1998) and Waever (1998) brought the idea of securitization in 
1990s. They argued that security is not pre-given, and an issue becomes a 
security issue when it is claimed to be so by state elites. This process of making 
an issue a security issue through speech act is called securitization. It is argued 
that security logic has become evident in other sectors such as society, 
environment and economy, though not as the result of an objective process but 
through speech acts. This is as well evident in the securitization of urban space 
where mobility is securitized and the space itself is constituted as a site that 
needs to be protected against various threats. For instance, the discourse of war 
on terror ties urban security to national security. On the other hand, others 
(Huysmans, 2006; Bigo, 2000; 2002) included daily practices of security 
professionals and experts into the process of securitization and showed how 
everyday life can be securitized through not just speech acts at exceptional 
moments but daily practices of security professionals and experts, i.e. “ongoing 
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processes of technocratic, bureaucratic and market-driven routinization and 
normalization” (C.A.S.E. Collective, 2006: 466). The politics of security which 
securitizes the everyday is called politics of unease: governing the everyday 
and the society through unease and risk. Security or securitization, in this 
sense, is “a mode of governmentality”, a technique (Bigo, 2002; 2008; 
C.A.S.E. Collective, 2006: 457). Governmentality of unease works through 
creating a risk society by putting many phenomena into the same basket. At 
times, poor communities in cities are included in this. Bigo and Tsoukala 
(2008: 7) wrote: 
Politics of unease is linked with the situation in a risk society and the 
development of many diverse mechanisms of surveillance, with global 
capitalism and unemployment, with urbanism and a planet of slums, 
with the conditions of late modern society and the roots of uncertainty 
of life. 
 
The questions that are fundamental to this approach are: “Who is doing an 
(in)securitization move, under what conditions, towards whom, and with what 
consequences?” (Bigo, 2008: 125). In this sense, what ‘power games’ of 
security professionals – their truth claims over danger, threat, risk or unease – 
do is a point of concern for these scholars (C.A.S.E. Collective, 2006: 457). 
What is crucial is that security logic is reproduced at the everyday by people.  
Yet, this approach has been criticized for its “security professionalism” 
(Bilgiç, 2013: 7; 2014) by way of focusing on experiences of security 
professionals or state officials as the legitimate actors of security and by not 
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being interested in the “professionals of nothing” (C.A.S.E. Collective, 2006: 
459). Not taking their stories into account can actually lead to “reinforce the 
power geometries and hierarchies they seek to disrupt” (Ingram and Dodds, 
2009: 11). Plus, security in this form of analysis tends to be “exclusion, 
totalization and even violence” (Nunes, 2012: 349). 
Studies on the politics of resistance focusing particularly on experiences 
of immigrants, refugees, and minorities (Mueller, 2004; Huysmans, 2006; 
Nyers, 2006) are exceptions to the disinterest in the everyday experiences of 
non-professionals that participate in the politics of protection, i.e. that ‘do’ 
security or resist its doing. Rather than dealing only with the effects of ‘power 
games’, this interest into politics of resistance is accompanied by the inquiry 
into the process of these ‘power games’, the capacity of representation, the 
agency: 
Who are the significant security agencies that modulate the meaning of 
protection and insecurity in the contest of competing security claims 
and practices and how is their transformative capacity structured and 
articulated? (Huysmans, 2006: 5) 
 
With these studies, the everyday is analysed as a site where the practices and 
discourses of professionals are not taken as they are, but challenged or 
negotiated (Huysmans, 2009). Similarly, but more explicitly, emancipatory 
approaches to security have an understanding of the everyday that is not 
passive. Rather than taking the everyday as a site that reproduces security 
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logics, these approaches aim to include the everyday with its agents that ‘do’ 
security into the politics of security.  
In this respect, for emancipatory approaches, security is a derivative 
concept determined by one’s philosophical and political stance (Booth, 1991). 
In the analysis of security, then, this approach starts from the experiences of 
insecurity of ‘real people in real places’ – that are ‘realities of security’ (Booth, 
2004). This approach made visible agents other than the state or professionals 
that ‘do’ security or that challenge the existing security understandings, besides 
the agents that already ‘securitize’ issues due to the insecurities they 
experience (Booth, 1997). Consequentially, issues considered as sources of 
insecurity become broadened with this deepening move that broadens those 
who define what security is. Broadening does not only naturally come after 
deepening, but also should come after it (Booth, 2007: 149-181). Moreover, for 
this approach, the claim for a broadening of the issues and referents is tied to 
the claims for non-state, non-military agency, non-violent and non-zero-sum 
practices (Bilgin, 1999; 2002). 
Therefore, this approach looks at how everyday insecurities can and do 
shape security understandings and security agenda. It is important to point that 
the everyday does not have to be analysed in one of two ways: as a reactionary 
site or as a passive site. As Richmond (2010; 2011a; 2011b) and Mac Ginty 
(2008; 2011) showed, the everyday is a site where the official and non-official, 
formal and informal negotiate, clash or collaborate. Politics of security may be 
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a combination dominated by the former (official and formal), but it can also be 
directed towards the latter (unofficial and informal). This chapter focuses on 
the former, whereas the next chapter questions the possibility of the latter in the 
context of the urban space and the contemporary forms of security and 
insecurity. 
To distinguish between the two, urban security will be analysed through 
a differentiation between ‘security of the city’ and ‘security within the city’. 
This echoes Wood’s differentiation, albeit different in meaning. Wood (2010), 
in his chapter in Routledge Handbook of New Security Studies, distinguishes 
between insecurity of the city and insecurity in the city. Insecurity of the city 
refers to threats to the city that is taken as a whole unit. It is related to the city’s 
place in warfare and global political economy. Insecurity in the city refers to 
the ‘inside’ of the city. It is related to the city’s role as a policing, ordering, 
“repression and control” mechanism subjected on those within (Wood, 2010: 
201). However, the two are inseparable as acknowledged by Wood. His 
differentiation is “heuristic rather than categorical” (Wood, 2010: 197). 
Inseparability of security of the city and in the city points to the blurred lines 
between an inside and outside; city is not a bounded unit. An analysis of 
contemporary urban insecurity clearly reveals this. One illustration of this is 
natural disasters.  
Even though the city is claimed to be secured against natural disasters, 
it is not the whole city. Although the earthquake in Bam in 2013 showed that 
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resilience to disasters in cities such as that of Iran is not equal to that of a city 
in the North (that is part of global networks and immersed in the global 
economy), the damage of Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans in 2004 showed 
that vulnerability to natural disasters is not a natural occurrence. It is directly 
related to marginality, and to being included or excluded from the city or 
whatever that is claimed to be secured. Other examples of “insecurity 
generated by marginality in the new global economy” include the earthquake 
Hanshin that destroyed Kobe’s poorer neighbourhoods in Japan, and the 
landslide in Manila that crushed homes and livelihoods of people in Payatas - 
“the city’s garbage dump” (Wood, 2010: 203).  
Elsewhere, Wood (2013) talks about ‘(in)security of the city’ and 
‘(in)security in the city’ in a slightly different manner. There, the distinction 
comes from different analyses of urban (in)security rather than a heuristic one. 
(In)security of the city refers to security knowledges that circulate through 
global city networks. It is considered to be a top-down approach whereas 
(in)security in the city is taken to be a more bottom-up approach, because the 
latter analysis of urban (in)security takes into its analysis the local concerns, 
knowledges and their interactions with other knowledges. An analysis as such 
reveals the multiplicity of referents and the struggles over whose security it is 
the urban security. He examines (in)security in Rio de Janeiro and come up 
with different sources of urban security knowledge existing within the city. 
Here, however, his analysis of the interaction of local and circulating 
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knowledges is dominated by a focus on the interaction between ‘internal’ and 
‘external’ security professionals. 
In this thesis, unlike Wood’s (2010), the differentiation is not a heuristic 
one. It is rather a division in terms of ‘who securitizes’, ‘whose security’, and 
‘what is security’. Security of the city refers to discourses and practices of 
urban security which result in more insecurity. This chapter aims at a critique 
of security of the city as a technique that ‘does things’ coupled with the 
question ‘whose security (gets to be involved in the security agenda)’. 
Although security of the city implies the whole city as its referent, some are 
pushed to the outside of this city. However, rather than taking security 
inherently as a negative or positive concept, this thesis aims to politicize urban 
security. After questioning the existing politics of security in this chapter, the 
possibility of a more positive form of security will be inquired in the following 
chapter.  
Arguing for such a change towards a different politics of security in 
terms of the city indicates an ethico-political choice that is in line with the 
emancipatory approach. This approach asks ‘what security should be’ with an 
explicit commitment to emancipatory project (Booth, 1997: 109). As Booth’s 
(1991: 319) much quoted words suggest: 
Security means the absence of threats. Emancipation is the freeing of 
people (as individuals and groups) from those physical and human 
constraints which stop them carrying out what they would freely choose 
to do. War and the threat of war is one of those constraints, together 
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with poverty, poor education, political oppression and so on. Security 
and emancipation are two sides of the same coin. Emancipation, not 
power or order, produces true security. 
 
Ethico-political dimension of politicization of security argues for a change in 
who gets to ‘define’ security and whose insecurities gets to be involved in the 
security agenda. These highly matter whether security can be “conceived 
globally and practised locally” and whether the people’s insecurities that are 
disregarded can be included in the security agenda (Bilgin, 2008: 99-100). 
Similarly, this thesis aims to bring humans/urban dwellers into the centre of 
politics of urban security. The first step towards this change is 
“problematization of the existing relations and structures in order to reveal how 
they hinder the realization of human freedoms” (Bilgiç, 2013: 57) and how 
they are based on elitist, statist, and militarist understandings in terms of both 
agency and referent (Bilgin, 2008a: 98-9). Then, “transformation” can be 
possible through “already existing, albeit marginalized, ideas and practices” 
(Bilgiç, 2013: 57). It is the immanent potential and the “pluralism of the 
politics of security” that are the focal points of this approach in its aspiration 
for change (Booth, 2005: 259-279; Bilgiç, 2013: 1-15). Therefore, the change 
that theory aspires can be possible only because it is already there as a 
potential. This indicates an understanding of theory and practice that are 
interwoven within each other, rather than being separate realms. 
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In terms of transformation, for emancipatory approaches, “the 
appropriate referent object” and agents change depending on the context (Wyn 
Jones, 1999: 116). The means and ends of security are not fixed. They are 
constituted and never ‘finished’ (Bilgin, 1999: 32). These choices depend upon 
“concrete analysis of particular issues and areas” (Wyn Jones, 1999: 121) and 
“historical contexting” (Alker, 2005: 189). Thus, the appropriate move – 
whether taking issues from the realm of security to the normal politics, i.e. 
‘desecuritization’ or ‘politicizing security’ – depend on the context (Alker, 
2005; Bilgin, 2008a: 100). Plus, meaning of emancipation cannot be fixed but 
is “localized and unfinished process” (Nunes, 2012: 353) and context-based. 
Thus, emancipation is not Emancipation, not a blueprint (Booth, 2007). That is 
what ‘false emancipation’ is: ‘timeless’, totalizing ‘wisdom’ disadvantaging 
others while advantaging some (Booth, 2007: 113). 
This chapter provides a critique of security of the city as a first step 
towards situating the possibility of security within the city, in other words, a 
change in the politics of urban security. For this aim, the discussion in this 
chapter is limited to the ways in which the city is ‘secured’ – through bordering 
– by state officials, security professionals and people that reproduce these 
borders. The following section focuses on these practices and asks what 
security (of the city) is, and what security (of the city) does in terms of the 
everyday. 
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3.2. Security and Bordering the City 
 
In the Special Issue on Urban Insecurities, Abrahamsen and others (2009) 
present the city as a challenge to Security Studies and IR. Because an analysis 
of the city reveal the complicated lines between inside and outside, private and 
public, global and local, police and military. It is also a challenge because of 
the security discourses that invade the city on the one hand, and the urban 
experiences that are considered as sources of insecurity on the other. The 
previous chapter focused on different bordering practices of the international 
other than the territorial state borders. This reveals both different practices and 
discourses of security, and different experiences of insecurity compared to a 
focus limited to state’s territorial borders. 
The relationship between security and the city is manifold. It includes 
issues such as war-making, war on terror, war on gangs, war on crime, and 
urbanization as a destructive process. The city is secured through bordering it, 
through managing circulation and inhibiting the bad mobility, through 
segregating space into safe and danger zones, through dividing behaviour into 
acceptable/desirable and abnormal/unacceptable, through laws that become 
part of these borders, and at times through suspending the law. The city is 
secured against disorder, organized and petty-crime, terrorist threat and anti-
social behaviour with wars on crime, drugs, gangs, poverty and so forth with 
old and new enemies of dissent, political activist, immigrant, poor, drug dealer, 
terrorist, and insurgent. The security of the city intertwines with other 
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discourses of national security, regional security, human security, international 
security, personal safety and safety of property.  
State assumes the role of the provider of security not in a broader sense 
of the term, but in terms of controlling, ordering and containing the borders 
that separate the ‘good’/’wanted’ from the ‘bad’/’unwanted’. Security in this 
sense means order and control, rather than being free from constraints. This 
results in security policies that are obsessed with surveillance, data-gathering, 
monitoring people, hence locking-down or ‘sealing off’ of the poor and 
unwanted (Bauman, 2004: 85). Spatialization is one way in which sovereign 
power works to designate those “who matter” and “what life counts as life to 
be fostered” along with “who is disposable” and “what can be allowed to die” 
or “expose[d] to death” (Foucault, 1975-76 [2003]; 1977-78 [2007]; Mbembe, 
2003). Thus, abandonment becomes a way of governing (see Selmeczi, 2010). 
This aspect of governing points at the ways power works through domination, 
destruction and marginalization. 
City’s relation to security and bordering will be analysed in terms of 
three sets of practices. First set of practices is warfare as cities are highly 
involved in war making. Second set of practices is planning and design which 
border cities in the name of securing them. Third set of practices is related to 
urbanization which works through bordering the city. 
 
 
58 
 
Cities have been closely related to war making. With industrialization, 
the city of 19th and 20th century became targets in wars; and strategic bombing 
and area bombing emerged in World War II (Coward, 2009: 402-3). Either 
total destruction or damaging infrastructure that is vital for war-making 
capacities of the enemy was aimed (Graham, 2004; Coward, 2009). During 
Cold War, urban space as a space for warfare was not considered to be the 
ideal battlefield by the Western policy-makers. If seen necessary to take action 
in the urban space, the strategy would be mostly a “total war against cities” 
destroying the whole city (Graham, 2009: 396). However, in the post-Cold War 
period, urbanity has become the specific target of war making in the form of 
targeting the ‘critical’ or ‘networked’ infrastructure which is not just vital for a 
city but which makes a city (Graham and Marvin, 2001; Coward, 2009: 404). 
Infrastructure included those systems of information, communication, 
transportation, logistics, and energy circulation and storage. This implicates an 
interruption of the city as a process:  
When our analytical focus centres on how the wires, ducts, tunnels, 
conduits, streets, highways and technical networks that interlace and 
infuse cities are constructed and used, modern urbanism emerges as an 
extraordinarily complex and dynamic sociotechnical process. (Graham 
and Marvin, 2001: 8) 
 
Targeting urbanity through targeting cities has been the case in several 
terrorist attacks in cities such as New York, Madrid, London, Istanbul, Jakarta, 
Riyadh and Mumbai (Graham, 2004a: 5). In these attacks mostly infrastructure 
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is targeted because it disrupts urban network. Also, the number of people 
affected is maximized and certain values represented by that infrastructure 
becomes damaged (Coward, 2009: 408). Certainly, urbanization of warfare is 
not only about terrorist attacks. This form of violence is caused by both state 
and non-state actors. Especially by the US policy-makers, military theorists and 
planners, urban space as a battlefield started to be regarded as a necessary 
component of counterinsurgency. This is when terms such as Military 
Operations on Urban Terrain were created and Revolution in Military Affairs 
was to be reformed in order to adjust to the necessities of the urbanized warfare 
in the cities of the Global South (Graham, 2008: 34-42). In fact, the US 
considers the “Third World city” as the “key battlespace of the future” (Davis, 
2004). Disrupting urbanity can mean “switching the city off” or “forced de-
modernization of cities and urban societies” as in the case of ‘Shock and Awe’ 
bombing of Baghdad by the US (Graham, 2005; Coward, 2009: 404-406). 
The second set of practices concerns planning, architecture and design 
of urban spaces. Among other issues, terror and crime as a security concern 
shapes cities via urban design and planning. Access to certain areas such as 
core commercial districts or international events is restricted through several 
measures of planning and design. Space in this sense is attempted to be made 
defensible through dividing it into controlled and fortified areas (Coaffee and 
Wood, 2006). Security measures are publicized to advertise those districts as 
‘safe havens’ in order for them to become attractive for investment and to 
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become commercial and finance centres once again. Most prominent example 
is the measures taken in the name of war on terror that consists looking for 
enemies ‘within’ and taking defensive measures through defensible spaces. 
One response given to crime and terrorist attacks is constructing a ‘ring of 
steel’ which started to be used in 1970s in Belfast and later in 1990s in New 
York and London. ‘Rings of steel’ are sites protected and sealed by 
surveillance cameras, organizing traffic in a certain way and putting visible or 
invisible barriers in the form of other objects such as sculptures, sitting banks 
or plants (Coaffee, 2004).  
However, ‘rings of steel’ targeted threats such as car bombs and came 
to be seen insufficient after 9/11. Emergency planning measures started to be 
replaced by more pre-emptive ones. This period is characterized by expansion 
and enhancement of surveillance infrastructure, gated communities, intensified 
security measures in sites such as airports and certain areas, and accelerated 
privatization of security (Coaffee and Wood, 2006). This shift towards pre-
emptive measures is called resilience planning specifically in the UK in an 
attempt to create resilient cities in the face of such risks as terrorist threats. 
Mass data-gathering and assessing risk, creating risk profiles and diffusing the 
responsibility towards several institutions are some features of this planning. In 
the US, the term ‘securescape’ refers to the specific urban design developed in 
the aftermath of 9/11 (Shapiro, 2009: 446). Access of pedestrians to certain 
places is restricted and controlled in this form of planning. It is argued that, by 
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way of this, the pedestrian becomes constituted as a threat, a new threat to 
urban security (Shapiro, 2009: 446). Along with these types of long term 
planning and urban design, resilience planning can be temporary as well 
(Coaffee and Wood, 2006). Temporary resilience strategies are taken during 
hosting important international events such as Olympics, World Cup, G20, and 
so forth. Nevertheless, surveillance infrastructure that is deployed during such 
events mostly become permanent and stay after the events finish. Along with 
terrorist threat, they are legitimized through other risks of crime and trafficking 
of drugs and humans. 
The third set of practices is related to urbanization and its associated 
processes of neoliberalism and globalization as discussed in the previous 
chapter. What was a solution to the symptoms of larger and structural problems 
have ended with the transformation from state-led to market-led development. 
Starting in the 1980s, neoliberalism became the dominant ‘strategy’ for 
development (Hettne, 2010). Infamous Washington Consensus started to be 
formed and the neoliberal logic of market-led development was pursued within 
‘developed’ states. This marked the end of welfare state policies related to 
housing and unemployment.  
As the consensus was presented as a “blueprint for development” for 
the Third World, end of the Cold War was an end to the former development 
strategy of state-led modernization in the cities of the South as well (Thomas 
and Williams, 2012: 301). Neoliberal policies such as structural adjustment 
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programs, privatization, and liberalization made sure nonmarket structures and 
public spheres were being “commodified and transferred to capital” (Robinson, 
1999: 44). This caused the states that are ‘developing’ to favour some groups 
over others, and “external economic forces” over “domestic society” (Hettne, 
2010: 43). As poor people and poor states were being presented as responsible 
for their own poverty, “the role of the state was redefined as the enabler of the 
private sector, facilitating privatization, liberalization and deregulation” 
(Thomas and Williams, 2012: 301). What marked the era of increasing 
neoliberal policies were urban wage reductions, transnationalized local elites, 
decline in public services and public sector, and speedy growth of informal 
sector (Robinson, 1999: 50-1). Cheap labour was seen as an opportunity for 
cities to have an advantageous position in the global economy in terms of 
lower production costs and foreign investment attraction. 
The (re)constitution of poverty as at the heart of all the problems is not 
new.  Underdevelopment has been directly linked with nesting threats – for the 
‘north’, for the “system as a whole” or the “global-life itself” (Duffield, 2010: 
68). It was the case in the communist ‘spread’ in the Third World in the 1950s, 
terrorism and high crime rates in urban areas in the 21st century. This appeared 
at the background of urban development projects that linked underdevelopment 
of certain parts of the city to security of the city in terms of order, and 
underdevelopment of the city in terms of the city’s place in the global 
economy. 
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Urbanization and neoliberalism as twin projects work with security 
discourses to reorganize and border the urban space through gentrification, 
destruction, eviction, displacement, demolition, and fundamentally through 
privatization. For instance, even if a regeneration project is carried out by the 
local government, it can use private security for matters such as the process of 
eviction and displacement of the people (see Rasmussen, 2007).   
These sets of practices that are part of a politics of security operate in 
the everyday urban space in different ways. Firstly, everyday life is securitized 
as it becomes invaded by the understanding of urbanized warfare and security. 
City becomes a space of both peace and war as the two become inseparable. 
For instance, as part of war on terror, peace time and war time cannot be 
separated any more as it becomes an endless war fought in many fronts 
including the home front of the city (Graham, 2005). However, in most of the 
cities around the world, security understandings of states and professionals 
invaded urban spaces and fortified public spaces well before 9/11 even in New 
York (Mitchell, 2003). Enemies ‘within’ could and can be migrants, homeless, 
gangs, drug dealers or political activists. Related policies are sometimes 
gathered under the name of ‘war on gangs’, ‘war on crime’, ‘war on drugs’, 
development projects and so forth. These are presented as part of the same 
problem by linking petty crime, organized crime, anti-social behaviour, 
terrorism, migration, disorder, poverty and underdevelopment together. 
Feelings of insecurity and uncertainty are fuelled through these linkages. 
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Deploying military style equipment and personnel within cities can as well fuel 
sentiments of fear and insecurity among people (Graham, 2004a: 12). It 
becomes common sense to deploy military personnel and equipment within the 
public space of cities or to divide, fortify and barricade some parts of cities. 
Thus, urban space and the everyday becomes militarized (Coaffee and Wood, 
2006; Graham, 2005; 2011). Then, it is not just policiarization of military that 
is taking place through a convergence and conflict in the traditional roles of 
police and military (Bigo, 2003: 111; 2004: 137), but military is also urbanized 
as its roles of security becomes more and more related to the urban space 
(Graham, 2004).  
Moreover, the built environment can shape people’s understandings and 
feelings of security and fear (Coaffee et al., 2009: 493). The appearance and 
visibility of security measures within cities whether in form of planning or not 
can raise the feelings of fear and risk. On the other hand, the visibility, 
appearance, and aesthetic aspects of design and measures of security have also 
become an issue of concern starting in mid-2000s (Dudley, 2007: 37). Since 
mobility or movement is one of the main tenets of cities, security design 
features should not exterminate and switch off this aspect of the city which 
makes a city. After all, some (good) mobility is needed for the survival and the 
continuation of the city (and global economy) while some (bad) mobility needs 
to be prevented. Urban security practices including urban design become a way 
of managing the mobility and circulation within the city to separate the 
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necessary and desirable from the unwanted and dangerous mobility (Weber 
and Lacy, 2011). As such, some of the daily practices of (in)securitization are 
hidden under the guise of “enhancing freedom of movement” (Bigo, 2008: 128; 
2010: 36). 
Secondly, as the everyday life and cities are securitized and militarized 
in response to fear of terror and crime, everyone potentially becomes a threat. 
What is crucial in terms of everyone becoming a potential threat and the 
securitization of urban life space is that they are accepted and more importantly 
reproduced by the society. Bigo (2002) calls this “governmentality of unease” 
in a risk society in which the feelings of unease and insecurity become a way 
of governing the society and governing the self. In terms of securitization of 
migration and linking migrants with crime, terror and unemployment, 
governmentality of unease serves for the sovereign power to keep on claiming 
the monopoly over providing security and protection while not really 
addressing and solving any problem. These practices result in understanding of 
the world and city as a risk-ridden and chaotic environment that necessitates 
the continuation of these practices. Through governmentality of unease, 
imagination of the world becomes “one of chaos and urban insecurity” (Bigo, 
2002: 81). In this process, immigrant, protestor or the homeless becomes the 
embodiment of any problem facing the society and the state.  
After 9/11, this aspect is visibly related to the measures taken as part of 
a war on terror. However, it is as well related to a war on the poor (Wacquant, 
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2003). Using the language of war and practices that resemble war and 
counterinsurgency, these campaigns work through policies such as increasing 
the number of police officers, prisons, new laws and harsher sentences. They 
sometimes work through “suspending the law” (Kyed, 2007: 151). The aims 
proclaimed in these campaigns are maintaining order, fighting with threats to 
this order and maintaining security of the wider community. Most policies 
taken under the name of these campaigns are overly publicized for providing 
security for the ‘community’. Contrary to their publicized claims they end up 
in criminalization of the poor, insecurity of certain communities and damage 
relationships between communities. These groups become potential threats and 
measures taken for securing the city against them become legitimized through 
this criminalization and securitization.  
This has been the case in Central America where urban gangs were 
considered to be directly involved in urban violence and crime by local 
authorities. In 2005, they were marked by external actors and observers as 
“new urban insurgency” threatening the states of the region (Jütersonke et al., 
2009: 377). With ambitious campaigns of war on gangs, those groups of gangs 
were represented as if constituting a transnational threat although they were 
involved in more local crimes (2009: 391).  
In Cape Town too, with the increased crime rates, campaigns such as 
war on crime and war on gangs were deployed starting with 1990s and 2000s. 
The increased crime levels correspond with the period right before the end of 
 
 
67 
 
apartheid regime and after the transition. Although at first, welfare policies 
with a developmental logic were employed by the post-apartheid state, later 
there was a shift towards neoliberal oriented policies, increased growth of 
private security sector and increased concern for security as community safety 
rather than development (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2011; Jensen, 2010). Fear 
of crime became a priority and certain groups became criminalized. In a way 
“war on gangs is not just a war against gangsters but a campaign launched in 
the areas and spaces and populations in which and among whom the gangs 
exist” (Jensen, 2010: 91).  
A war on the poor at the background of war on drugs, crime or gangs 
that criminalize and securitize certain groups is not limited to the cities of the 
Global South. End of the welfare state policies such as those related to 
unemployment and social housing in 1980s and 1990s prepared the ground for 
policies for a ‘war’ as such in some contexts. One policy as such was the 
implementation of a law on beggars and squeegeers named Safe Streets Act in 
2000 in the province of Ontario. Policies that restricted the welfare programs 
such as social housing are seen as the cause of high rates of homelessness in 
Canada’s urban centres, especially in Toronto where it came to be represented 
as a national disaster in 1998 (Heroux, 2011: 111-112). 
Begging, homelessness and taking care of basic needs – including 
sleeping – in public space were all condemned for threatening business, 
tourism and “quality of life” of those felt threatened (Heroux, 2011: 113). In 
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Toronto for example programs such as Project 35, Project 40, Community 
Action Planning and Toronto Anti-Violence Intervention Strategy were 
adopted throughout the 1990s and 2000s. With these programs, crime control 
became an important issue and a priority. Those who are targeted became 
public enemies; fighting crime meant cleaning up (Heroux, 2011: 123). The 
targets of this fight were declared to be drugs, prostitution and gangs. However 
squeegee kids, panhandlers and vandals were targeted at the same time. 
Moreover, petty-crime and anti-social behaviour became main targets as it was 
believed that fighting with these would prevent other crimes that are less 
visible. However, the promise of a ‘safer’ community provided by such 
programs – Project 35 and 40, CAP, and TAVIS – did not seem to work.  
Overall, these programs’ main target is generally not the underlying 
causes of the problems faced by poorer communities. By targeting the 
symptoms of poverty such as homelessness, drugs, gangs, prostitution, and 
informal economy, these programs work to criminalize these symptoms, hence 
the poor. In that sense, they do not work for the safety of poorer communities 
or hindering violence. Moreover, they do not end up providing safety to the 
wider community as well. On the one hand, targeting only the symptoms 
results in either temporary prevention or moving those symptoms from one 
place to another. On the other hand, damaging relationships and trust within 
and between communities, and targeting certain groups excessively, do not 
serve for security or safety of the wider community as well. In Toronto case, 
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projects were blamed for further insecuring the community through damaging 
trust between youth, police, racial segments, and other parts of the community. 
Raids led to interrogation of people who did not actually engage in criminal 
activities but who became criminalized for being poor. Moreover, mass 
evictions followed these raids showing how everyone was criminalized 
(Heroux, 2011: 130).  
This has become a daily experience for those who face such programs 
and policies of a ‘war on the poor’. This daily experience of some city-dwellers 
becomes a general condition during global events taking place in cities. 
Continuing with the example of Toronto where G20 summit took place in 
2010, those policies used in the war on the poor were combined with measures 
of a war on terror. They were implemented towards everyone and not just 
protesters both before and during the event which ended up in mass arrests 
(Heroux, 2011: 132). Fortifications during urban summits or international 
events are “increasingly violent, temporary urban sieges”. They protect those 
that are ‘inside’ from the protestors. This makes ‘outside’ “the other side of the 
street” (Graham, 2004a: 5). 
Criminalization and securitization of the poor and ‘underdeveloped’ is 
as well embedded in the discourse of development/security (Duffield, 2005; 
2010; DuBois, 1991; Chandler, 2007; Hettne, 2010; Stern and Öjendal, 2010). 
Several scholars discuss security-development in relation to cities and their 
inhabitants (see Buur et al., 2007; Jensen, 2010; Orjuela, 2010). For instance, 
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urban violence is considered as a hindrance against development while 
underdevelopment is seen as a threat to security. Linking poverty directly with 
urban violence criminalizes and securitizes the poor. Hence, the answer to 
whose security/development does not get to be those “underdeveloped” or 
perpetrators and victims of violence, but the “developed” and worthy of 
securing. Securing the city, the nation, or the region may result in insecurities 
for some who find themselves “at the margins of this nation”, this city, or this 
region (Orjuela, 2010) and who find themselves as threats to this security. This 
division between who constitutes the community, the city – or another referent 
that is claimed to be “secured” – and who is not part of it becomes a division 
between “law-abiding, tax paying and decent” city-dwellers and “illegal, 
criminal and non-paying” urban poor (Rasmussen, 2007: 176; see also Jensen, 
2010: 83) who find themselves outside of “righteous forms of citizenship” 
(Kyed, 2007). This can be through explicit and visible but also invisible 
practices of criminalization and securitization aiming at elimination of these to 
be outsiders, can be through containment and repression or it can be simply 
through abandonment, being ignored and categorized as useless (Buur, Jensen 
and Stepputat, 2007).  
Security of the city is never the security of the ‘waste’ as Bauman’s 
analogy of ‘wasted humans’ discussed in the previous chapter reminds us 
(2004). Those superfluous lives might find themselves at the front line of a 
‘war’ – war on terror, crime, drugs, gangs, etc. – that is fought in the name of 
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the city, the country, the state, the global, the international and the community 
that they apparently are not considered to be a part of. 
Security practices are employed in order to strengthen the bordering 
between two worlds, to stop the other world from being visible or trespass to 
the world it does not belong. Those practitioners and agents of security are 
likened to “rubbish collectors” by Bauman. They work for bordering, dividing 
“the inside and the outside of the human universe”, and “separating order from 
chaos” (Bauman, 2004: 28). This division needs to be practiced continuously 
so that the border continues to exist. 
(Re)production of this separation (and deeming of some people as 
unwanted) works to protect the way of living that is deemed worthy as opposed 
to those unworthy. Thus, what goes unnoticed is that the unworthy is used for 
this protection and sustaining this way of life. Bauman especially considers 
immigrants as those who find themselves on the ‘unwanted’ side of the border 
though they are used for the continuity and sustainability of the way of life that 
is desirable and worthy. All in all waste is obviously invisible – if not appear as 
the enemy – in the narrative of the city or its success story.  
Thirdly, as security becomes commodified, exclusionary practices of 
security become even more scattered with gated communities, private security 
personnel and companies. Security becomes a responsibility of all since, firstly, 
threats are ever more personal concerning daily lives and secondly everyone 
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can achieve security as it becomes something to be achieved through 
commodification. In other words, security that becomes personal security, at 
the same time becomes everyone’s responsibility (Coaffee and Wood, 2006: 
514). This creates a responsible citizen that sees the world and his/her 
immediate environment as chaotic and full of risks directly related to his/her 
personal life. Hence, a citizen that conducts him/herself with this awareness 
and acceptance (Bhandar, 2004).   
Responsibilization can work along with criminalization. For instance, 
after the end of the apartheid regime in Cape Town, participation of the 
community in security policies was encouraged for the purposes of 
accountability. However, in 1990s and 2000s, this was replaced by 
responsibilization of community members where gangs existed and crime rates 
were high (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2011; Jensen, 2010). This made all 
community members suspects of either being a gang member or helping gangs 
(Jensen, 2010: 91).  
Fourthly, the everyday is colonized through these practices that result in 
urbicide (Lefebvre, 1991; Gregory, 1994; Kipfer and Goonewardena, 2007). 
Urbicide is the act of targeting a city with the aim of disrupting its urbanity 
(Coward, 2004; 2007; Shaw, 2004; Kipfer and Goonewardena, 2007; Graham, 
2004). Both attacking cities and urbanization as a destructive process can aim 
to disrupt urbanity. Urbicide was first used as a term in 1960s to criticize the 
urban development projects in the US for unintentionally ruining the city life. 
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Later it was considered to be intentional and “as a strategic objective in its own 
right” (Campbell, Graham and Monk, 2007: 6). For example, the 1992-5 
Bosnian War reveals that destruction of built environments did not just 
coincide with the violent acts of ethnic cleansing, but were deliberate acts 
targeting urbanity that represented heterogeneity and plurality (Coward, 2004). 
Apart from targeting diversity, targeting critical and networked infrastructure 
as urbicide can mean destroying urbanity that represents resistance, challenge, 
and independence (Gregory, 2004; Kipfer and Goonewardena, 2007). Results 
of such urbicide can be a decreased capacity of resistance and independence. In 
Zimbabwe for instance, the state campaign for cleaning some parts of cities 
from informal economy in 2005 – the Operation Restore Order – included 
eviction, displacement, demolition, torture and imprisonment. However, it was 
a form of state building because it actually aimed at eliminating the opposition 
to the ruling party (Hammar, 2007). 
These exclusionary and violent practices of urban security are moves 
towards pacifying the everyday as well. Neocleous (2011) talks about how 
security is used as a technique for pacification and for securing the capitalist 
accumulation and colonization starting from the colonization of the Americas 
by the Spaniards in 16th century. Pacification and security are mechanisms of 
power that is not just repressive but productive or “constitutive” as well, in the 
sense that it produces subjects (2011: 26). To put it more precisely, pacification 
which works through the technologies of security acts upon everyday life and 
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serves for constituting subjects that are proper for capitalism. In other words, 
“ideal citizen-subjects” are created in this process of pacification through 
security (2011: 35). The processes of pacification outside and inside help each 
other. Neocleous calls the latter one ‘internal pacification’ noting that colonial 
or internal pacification should not be considered separately as they are part of 
“the logic of security as a whole” (2011: 41), a logic that works not just for 
repression or defeating resistance or enemy, but also for producing proper 
subjects with proper behaviours: 
[S]ubsumed under the new language of military intervention is nothing 
less than the pacification of domestic as well as imperial resistance, the 
‘enemy within’ as well as the ‘enemy without’, as security moves back 
and forth between the national and international, as the urban crisis gets 
redefined as a national security crisis and vice versa. (Neocleous, 2011: 
52) 
 
Security of the city then operates through an understanding of security 
that pacifies and produces relations of exclusion, violence and exploitation. 
These sets of practices related to urbicide form colonial relations and colonize 
the everyday life through forming domination, destroying resistance and 
independence, and separating urban space into valuable and de-valorized parts 
in terms of centre and periphery. Urbicide is part of colonial relations. It is 
outward as can be seen in forms of exploitation and the attacks under the name 
of ‘war on terror’. Complementing this process is inward colonial relations as 
can be seen with urbanization. Urbanization here means the urban destruction 
and reorganization that takes place ‘inside’ the colonizers’ cities:  
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'Urbicide' is one, violently coercive means towards such a territorial 
reorganization of centre-periphery relations. One may apply the concept 
not only to the military planning exercises in Iraq, Lebanon and 
Palestine but also to the more confined and selective cases of 
destroying, gentrifying and privatizing ghettoized spaces (public 
housing districts, racialized social spaces) in metropolitan urban 
centres. (Kipfer and Goonewardena, 2007: 51) 
 
What is crucial is that segregated spaces of centre and periphery do not 
only exist between cities but within cities – whether considered as a 
‘metropolitan urban centre’ or a peripheral city. 
Fifthly, these practices within the city become depoliticized as they 
become more and more part of a technology of security, a ‘science’, an 
expertise, and an issue of planning. The decisions that result in certain 
understandings and practices of (urban) security do not get to be questioned as 
if they are part of a technical process (of technology and design) (see Bigo, 
2008; Dudley 2007; Weber and Lacy, 2011) or a part of the ‘global patterns of 
urbanization’ that one cannot ‘escape’.  
Through linking these sets of practices to national security, regional 
security, international security, personal safety, and development, the 
insecurities they cause have been made invisible. Sources of insecurity are 
masked through presenting those who experience insecurities as the root of all 
problems they face. 
Last but not least, these sets of practices and their above mentioned 
repercussions reveal the interconnectedness of the everyday ‘here’ and ‘there’, 
 
 
76 
 
hence a different form of mapping of the international which was inquired in 
the previous chapter. The home-city and other-city are linked through security 
industry in a less apparent way. As the militarized and policing techniques are 
deployed by the Western states and private companies in the urban spaces of 
the Global South, they are also deployed and imitated in the cities of the West 
“through the securitization of Western urban life” (Graham, 2011: XVII). 
Graham explains this by adopting Foucault’s term ‘boomerang effects’ to the 
war on terror: 
At the end of the sixteenth century we have, then, if not the first, at least 
an early example of the sort of boomerang effect colonial practice can 
have on the juridico-political structures of the West. It should never be 
forgotten that while colonization, with its techniques and its political 
and juridical weapons, obviously transported European models to other 
continents, it also had a considerable boomerang effect on the 
mechanisms of power in the West, and on the apparatus, institutions, 
and techniques of power. A whole series of colonial models was 
brought back to the West, and the result was that the West could 
practice something resembling colonization, or an internal colonialism 
on itself. (Foucault, 1975-76 [2003]: 103)  
 
It is argued that this internal colonialism has been taking place through 
the importation of certain practices of security such as non-lethal weapons and 
security zones (Graham, 2011: XVIII). The security industry links the cities of 
the South and the North. This growing economy of technologies of security 
links the colonized cities of South as test grounds with cities of North where 
those technologies that are tested can be sold. For example, the CCTV 
technology used in the early 1990s in London was imported from the first Gulf 
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War (Coaffee and Wood, 2006: 506). Military style equipment and technology 
used in the cities of the home front mostly come from other fronts in Other 
cities. With its “multinational capital”, privatized “surveillant economy” is a 
very profitable market (Graham, 2011: XXIII). Urban destruction on the other 
hand might be profitable for those construction companies such as Halliburton 
that was “granted no-bid contracts in Iraq and Louisiana to rebuild cities 
devastated by Bush Administration policies” (Dudley, 2007).  
Consequently, the cities of ‘North/South’, ‘West/non-West’, or 
‘homeland/colonial frontier’ are very much alike in their techniques of policing 
and controlling and in their fortifications within cities. But most importantly, it 
shows their interconnectedness or “umbilical” (Graham, 2011: XXVII) 
relationship although imagined as distinct spaces of inside-outside. Graham 
(2004c: 331) wrote: 
The destruction and violence wrought by terror and war often mimic, 
and accentuate, the wider processes of destruction and creation forged 
through acts of planning, modernization, civil reconstruction, tides of 
hyperactive speculation, urban investment (and disinvestment), 
innovation, and technological development that characterize capitalist 
urban change. 
 
In terms of political imagination, internal colonialism and its practices 
of security reproduce the imagination of civilized-barbaric dichotomy within 
the cities of the home front. Within cities, some parts are taken to be separate, 
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underdeveloped, dangerous and threatening similar to the way the Other cities 
of the war on terror are imagined (Graham, 2011: XIX).  
Imagination of the city can rest on a differentiation between the 
civilized and barbaric, developed and underdeveloped that is space-bound. War 
on terror, for example, invokes this imagination of here and there in terms of 
civilization and barbarism, and Good and Evil (Gregory, 2004). The 
construction of space through the binary of civilized self and the barbaric other 
continues to be (re)produced through war on terror with binaries such as US 
city-‘homeland’ and Arab city-‘terrorist nest’ (Graham, 2006). ‘Imaginative 
geographies’ as Said (1979: 54) puts it, (re)produce and are (re)produced by 
the violent practices of military urbanism. In the case of ‘war on terror’, US 
cities are reimagined as homeland cities in which borders are drawn 
everywhere for the sake of national security, to find out who and what is a 
threat. Arab cities are reimagined as underdeveloped, “asocial”, “mere 
battlespace” with bodies as mere “targets” (Graham, 2006: 258-267). 
Therefore, cities are imagined on a hierarchical line, hence the urban subjects 
living within them. The lives that are affected by the measures taken under the 
name of war on terror – lives of Iraqis and Afghanis for example – become 
“collateral damage” (Graham, 2006: 263).  
On the other hand, practices under the name of war on terror shatter the 
traditional imagination of ‘here’ (“homeland”, city, or country) as a separate 
entity from ‘there’ (“colonial frontiers”) (Graham, 2006). In spite of the 
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imagination of separateness, the ‘two’ domains of ‘homeland’ and ‘colonial 
frontiers’ are interlinked. This is especially evident in security discourses that 
conceive the latter as a threat to the security of the former. They are “treated as 
a single, and increasingly integrated, urbanizing ‘battlespace’” (Graham, 2006: 
258). In this sense, the city space of the Global North as “home front” becomes 
the new front of the war on terror (Coaffee and Wood, 2006; Coaffee et al., 
2009). 
Another link between ‘here’ and ‘there’ appears when some countries 
receive international assistance in their ‘fight’ or ‘war’ against crime, gangs 
and drugs. The main objective of this assistance is to prevent organized crime 
that is considered as a threat to other (Western) countries. An example of this 
latter concern is the war on drugs campaign that is deployed in Colombia and 
funded by the US. Although concerns over drug-trafficking might be involved, 
the campaign did not achieve any results in terms of this concern. Rather what 
happens is an attempt of “crushing political opposition movements, 
disciplining subjects and justifying to the public new forms of warfare and the 
new technologies by which this warfare is to be conducted” (Neocleous, 2011: 
44).  
The US intervention in Colombia is not limited to the war on drugs. US 
funding and assistance started during the Cold War and continues after 9/11. It 
took the form of and used the language of war on communism, war on drugs 
and lately war on terror (Monbiot, 2003; Neocleous, 2011: 44). The US 
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involvement and funding empowers certain groups over others as the 
Colombian army assists certain groups. The groups that work with the 
Colombian army – mainly right-wing paramilitaries – engage in violent 
practices such as mutilation, castration, kidnap, massacres and “the killing of 
homeless people, drug addicts and petty criminals” which can be called “social 
cleansing” (Monbiot, 2003). Apart from keeping stability that serves the US 
interests, the objectives of such a war is to “secure those parts of the country 
which are rich in natural resources for Colombian landowners and foreign 
multinationals” (Monbiot, 2003).  
Another explicit interconnectedness comes with privatization of 
security which results in transnationalization of security sector with 
transnational corporations being involved as it was in Cape Town (Abrahamsen 
and Williams, 2011). Privatization of security was supported by international 
organizations as well. UNDP, for instance, supported this process through 
Urban Management Programme. War on gangs and crime –with the shift in 
security understanding towards community safety – correspond to this period 
of foreign assistance and private security sector growth (Abrahamsen and 
Williams, 2011: 185).  
Clearly, it would be a mistake to reduce securitized urban space to a 
post-9/11 or war on terror period. What seems more apparent, visible and 
legitimized with war on terror has been the case long before 9/11. The security 
practices within cities to ‘secure’ the city are not reducible to war on terror, 
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cautions against accelerated mobility of people, or fight against increased 
crime rates in all the cities around the world. Fortification of public space, 
militarization and securitization of urban space, and fragmented urban zones 
dates back long before fear of terror; and in different cities, different groups are 
made into enemies or threats. 
Wood (2013) argues that understandings of security circulate through 
cities all around the world. This is not to say that these are immediately 
accepted, adopted and reproduced within those cities. In fact, he emphasizes 
the ways in which local discourses and practices work with the circulating 
security knowledge. He identifies several “sources of global urban security 
knowledge” in the context of Rio de Janeiro. These include militarized security 
practices such as that of Haiti, planning and more inclusionary practices such 
as education programs in Colombia, New York’s ‘Zero Tolerance’ policy 
against crime, Israeli community policing, and surveillance technologies. 
These policies are mostly imported from other cities without taking into 
consideration the specific contexts. Exchange of advisors between cities and 
professional traineeships in other cities are common in this circulation of 
security knowledge. Furthermore, security knowledge circulates through 
international events. As cities host international events such as sports mega-
events security becomes a priority to promote the city and protect its place in 
the global economy (Wood, 2013: 198).  
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Both local and global issues interpenetrate in securitization of urban 
space. In Japan for example, use of massive surveillance technologies and 
policies, gated towns and walled spaces cannot be separated from 
understandings and discourses shaped by the US occupation in 1946, gas attack 
on Tokyo in 1995, terrorist attacks in other cities all around the world, war on 
terror, international airport security requirements, immigration, hosting World 
Cup in 2002 and traditional ‘internal enemies’ such as Japanese mafia and anti-
governmental groups of students, communists, and nationalists that were active 
after 1970s (Wood et al., 2007).  
However, apart from these circulating security knowledges ad local (but 
official) discourses and practices, there is also the everyday as an active site 
that has a play in the politics of security. Its role may be weak or may be 
invisible through such an analysis. The next chapter aims to bring the agency 
of the everyday to the forefront in an analysis of politics of (urban) security. 
 
 
3.3. Conclusion 
 
This chapter aimed to explore how practices of security border the city, and 
problematize the existing dominant understandings and policies of security. It 
is argued that securing the city works through exclusion, abandonment, 
exploitation, destruction or containment. In answering the questions of what 
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security does, how security is done, what ‘security of the city’ is, and ‘whose 
security is the security of the city’, the existing (urban) security policies and 
agendas are questioned based on a critique of security as a technique that 
governs, disciplines, contains, excludes, divides and pacifies. It is argued that 
urbanization and warfare through cities (as well as measures of urban planning 
and design) securitize the everyday, criminalize certain groups, and 
depoliticize security. Moreover, as practices of colonialism, they hierarchize 
space and fragment it into centre-and-periphery-like units within and between 
cities. In light of these findings, this chapter showed, it is not the ‘city’ that is 
secured through bordering, or any other object that is claimed to be secured 
through securing the city. But it is the preservation of these (exclusionary and 
exploitative) relations and the desirable, the acceptable and the normal. 
Security of the city is security of these relations that is resulting in many 
insecurities both ‘inside’ (within the city’s immediate environment) and 
‘outside’ (other cities or other places). 
However, these are not the only answers that can be given to ‘how 
security is done’, understood, and practiced. Rethinking security also entails 
including others in the struggle over what security is. In the context of the city, 
this can be through engaging with how the urban dwellers themselves and not 
security professionals solely, consider certain issues as sources of insecurity 
and do security themselves. It is not always the case that individuals play into 
the practices of securitization through being in accordance with the feelings of 
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insecurity and fear. The everyday of the urban dweller is an active site not just 
in terms of reproducing the sentiments of uncertainty but also in terms of 
acting upon, negotiating, resisting, and doing security. Moreover, it is a site in 
which the boundaries of political community are redrawn. This makes possible 
a different understanding of security within the city that is more inclusionary 
and ‘right to the city’ based.  
This possibility of security within the city refers to broadened referents 
through different understandings of security. It does not only aim to make 
visible several insecurities experienced by those excluded, and how others ‘do’ 
security, but also aims to evoke an understanding of security as co-existence 
(within the city) based on the right to the city approach. For this aim, instead of 
a total dismissal of the concept of security, the analysis will focus on the 
different ways in which it is understood, practiced and experienced by different 
groups and individuals. This task will be taken up in the following chapter 
where agency and resistance in terms of the everyday will be discussed in the 
context of the city space. Security understandings and practices, in fact, 
circulate through cities all around the world. However, this does not 
necessarily mean that traveling security logics are adopted everywhere. Rather, 
security is contested, constructed, reconstructed, negotiated and worked upon 
by a myriad of actors including those who might not be acknowledged as 
actors. In Chapter 4, how different groups ‘do’ security and what this means 
and can mean for security within the city will be discussed. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
RETHINKING THE EVERYDAY 
 
 
 
The everyday can be approached both as passive and as existing in reaction to 
an ‘outside’ dominant force. However, as discussed in the first chapter, the 
local and the everyday neither simply exist in reaction to the ‘outside’, nor they 
are passive sites that are shaped by the official, the international or the global.  
The borders of the international can be constructed and secured not just 
at exceptional moments but through daily practices of professionals – for 
instance within and through cities as the previous chapter showed. However, at 
the everyday, these practices are not accepted as they are. They are not just 
reproduced at the everyday. The previous chapter dealt with securing and 
constituting the borders of the international through the city with politics of 
security of the city. It showed how security can be exclusionary, violent and 
produce more insecurity at the everyday. 
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However, these security understandings that travel across cities are not 
the only ones that shape the answer to what security is. The everyday urban 
space is a site of struggle in which contending security understandings emerge. 
Thus, dominant and the official security understandings do not naturally shape 
what security is for the urban dweller. When others are included to the answer, 
different insecurities and different strategies of security employed to confront 
these insecurities get into the picture. More importantly, though, a potentiality 
of security (within the city) as co-existence that is right (to the city) and needs 
based comes into view. 
What this chapter proposes – rethinking the everyday and the local in 
terms of agency and resistance they inhabit – is that (re)mapping practices of 
the international are not under the monopoly of the official formal actors but 
people in everyday life engage in these practices. One possible and valuable 
focal point for International Relations and Security Studies is the urban space 
with its state actors, private security personnel and non-expert agents which are 
the subjects of this chapter: the non-professionals, non-officials and mostly 
those that are not considered as ‘proper’ agents by the lens of the state-centred 
analysis of traditional and some critical approaches to security.  
This chapter directs attention to the everyday in order to analyse the 
agency of the urban dweller both in terms of the international and security. For 
this aim, firstly, what a rethinking of the local and the everyday in terms of 
agency and resistance entails will be discussed. Then, social movements will 
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be picked up as mobilized resistance that take place locally within the urban 
space but transcend the state boundaries. Finally, through an understanding of 
the everyday in terms of ‘critical agency’ that is transformative and resistant 
(Richmond, 2011), the possibility of security as co-existence within the city – 
that is rights and needs based – will be inquired. 
 
 
4.1. Local, the Everyday and Resistance 
 
‘Local’ can be used in a variety of ways including social, political or territorial 
space (Walker, 1988: 84). ‘Local’ here is not used as another level of analysis 
in positivist terms, i.e. a territorial space in a binary relationship with the state 
or global. Instead, it refers to “the venue for everyday life” (Magnusson, 1990: 
45), a site where everyday practices take place, a social and political space. 
Moreover, it is a site where interconnections between people’s everyday lives 
and global structures are most visible. Then, everyday should also not be 
understood as yet another level of analysis in a positivist sense “to which we 
can turn for the truth” (Campbell, 1996: 23). The everyday and local are seen 
as sites of constant interactions and global interconnections, resistances, 
formation of alternative loyalties and identities. In Campbell’s (1996: 23) 
words: 
Everyday life is thus a transversal site of contestations rather than a 
fixed level of analysis. … [It] is transversal because the conflicts 
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manifested there not only transverse all boundaries; they are about 
those boundaries, their erasure or inscription, and the identity 
formations to which they give rise. 
Boundaries of political community are drawn in the local and the everyday. 
Locality, everyday life and social movements are sites for challenging the 
state’s claimed dominance over deciding the limits of political community 
(Magnusson, 1990). However, those are made invisible or “disappear except 
constructs of state and the market” (Magnusson, 1990: 48). An act of 
enclosing of political community is considered to be necessary by the state 
through deciding who gets to be included in the political community and who 
does not. Other community making boundary practices of “localities, cities, 
districts, regions, and international communities” (Magnusson, 1990: 49) are 
made invisible as ‘nations’ are made the primary and sole source of political 
community. The localities or everyday life do not have fixed boundaries; they 
transverse, go beyond the artificial boundaries of political community and the 
boundaries of neighbourhood, of the block, of the city, of the state 
(Magnusson, 1990).  
Locality in terms of its own boundary-making processes and resistance 
can be thought of in two ways: social movements and the everyday. A theory 
of resistance is said to be what is lacking in IR, an IR that becomes 
disciplinary in terms of the power relations that it has already been a part of 
while emerging as a discipline (Richmond, 2011a). Resistance or critical 
agency emerges in IR as a ‘reactive’ force, but not as itself constitutive of 
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wider political structures and itself having a form of legitimacy on its own. It 
is as well not taken as constituting a part of transformation or change. Even 
when transformation is aspired, the possibility of change is searched outside 
the actors’ capacities – the actors that the transformation seems to be most 
necessary for and demanded by. Only the resistance that is directed through 
formal channels are considered to be legitimate, or, to be resistant agency 
itself. This excludes other forms of critical agency that is mostly local and that 
happen at the everyday (Richmond, 2011a). 
Then, if resistance is due to have a place in the study of the 
international, IR needs to turn its gaze towards the everyday (Richmond, 
2011a: 430). That way it can escape its empirical unhelpfulness and being a 
normative justification of the status quo. He (2011a: 432) wrote: 
Resistance and critical agency can be seen as a local and international 
conversation about the impact of hegemony, colonial praxis, the global 
economy and the reconstitution of rights, needs and identity. This 
conversation is carried along transversal, transnational networks and 
merges both the liberal and the local, the global north and south. 
 
For Richmond the question is not about the existence of such an impact of the 
everyday on the international. It is not a ‘yes/no’ question, but a ‘how’ 
question: “how do the ‘powerless’ engage in politics and international 
relations?”, “how are they facilitated, blocked and co-opted, and how do they 
maintain legitimacy, integrity and autonomy where they can?” (2011a: 434). 
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This thesis tries to answer these questions through cities and through 
abovementioned everyday bordering practices of city dwellers.  
Boundary practices within the city (physical or not) may constitute 
binary relationships of internal/external, domestic/foreign, modern/non-
modern. In this sense, the everyday becomes where the ‘international’ takes 
place. Understanding the international by understanding these boundaries 
necessitates looking at the everyday practices of people whether they 
reproduce, negotiate or challenge them. The international and its subjects are 
constituted through these practices in and across the city. Öncü and Weyland’s 
inquiry is very relevant in this sense: “how the ‘global’ is translated by 
different groups of urban actors into practices which transform the physical as 
well as social and cultural spaces of the city” (1997: 2). Looking only at the 
official (state officials, security professionals, etc) and making everyday lives 
of people invisible (re)produces a top-down approach, a “god’s eye view” 
(Walker, 1988: 7). On the contrary, realizing the latter as inherent to the 
international opens up the possibility of recognizing critical agency and 
“forms of hidden, everyday forms of resistance” although not visible in 
traditional IR (Richmond, 2011a: 423). Taking into account the latter enables 
any possibility of alternatives from below. Moreover, looking at the city and 
the everyday lives of people makes visible the interconnections between here 
and there, local and global showing that state is not the only mediatory in 
these relationships. Looking at the everyday directly challenges any 
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imagination based upon a “simple reading in such binary oppositions as 
traditional/modern, indigenous/foreign or local/global” (Öncü and Weyland, 
1997: 10) rather highlighting the interconnections, interactions and blurred 
lines between those categories.  
There are mainly two ways the local is emphasized as a site of 
resistance. One is more institutionalized. It takes the local as its space and 
derives from the everyday, but as it is institutionalized by mobilization it 
becomes no longer part of the everyday. Critical social movements are one 
example of this (Richmond, 2008; Walker, 1988). In relation to the processes 
of the urban and the international, the next part of this chapter looks at social 
movements for an understanding of the active local that is not limited to the 
state borders.  
A second way of looking at the local as a site of resistance is focusing 
on the everyday. The everyday can be a site of reproducing existing power 
relations or resisting them. However the two processes are not easily separated. 
It is not that the everyday exists as a reactionary site to a ‘totalizing’ 
international. Rather, the two mutually interact as the everyday is a site itself 
that plays a constitutive role. This suggests overcoming the international-
everyday binary as well as the global-local binary discussed in Chapter 2. 
The everyday does not naturally and necessarily mean critical agency. It 
may have a role in reproducing disciplinary and exclusionary practices and 
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understandings more than challenging them. This is the case in relation to the 
security practices of the urban space which was the subject of the previous 
chapter. However in the everyday these practices are not taken as they are, plus 
the everyday can be more active or challenging.  
In line with this separation, firstly, the institutionalized and more 
recognized mode of resistance is discussed. Later the everyday as a less 
recognized form of resistance and agency is analysed in terms of the security 
within the city. 
 
 
4.2. Social Movements 
 
A way of looking at the local as a site of resistance and non-state agency is to 
examine social movements (Walker, 1988; Magnusson, 1990; Ruiz, 1990; 
Bilgin, 2002; 2003; Wyn Jones, 1995). Conventional studies of international 
relations did not have much interest in social movements as they did not in 
everyday life or ordinary people. Even when their existence is recognized by 
IR, they have been rendered as social problems (Shapiro, 1996: xv), 
insignificant or impotent (Walker, 1988: 8), “outside of politics” or tried to be 
incorporated into the “state-centric political categories” through containing 
and institutionalizing (Magnusson, 1990: 51). These, however, are of growing 
interest to many scholars that are critical of the traditional state-centred IR. In 
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most studies they are seen as hopes for challenging the dominancy of state, 
considered as a challenge to the dominant discourse of IR and as “part of a 
transformative assault on our inherited notions of authority, legitimacy, and 
power” (Walker, 1988: 8) because they allow people to understand the 
constructedness of those notions and how come their constructedness becomes 
possible. Once this is understood, it is claimed, there comes the possibility of 
changing “the realities derived from them” (George, 1996: 69). Without 
exaggerating their power in the present, for Walker (1988), they are hopes for 
future for two reasons. Firstly, they are expressive of “alternative ways of 
knowing and acting” (1988: 30), and rethinking the meanings of security and 
development. Secondly, they attempt at presenting new ways of realizing 
those new alternatives. What makes these movements even more important is 
that they form part of daily lives of people, and by this, they are a big part of 
the processes in which people give meaning to their lives and the world and 
imagine the international. Hence, they are a chance for surpassing “the 
dominant ways of thinking, speaking, and acting in modernist political 
society” from the bottom-up (Walker, 1988: 8). This is against what realist 
tradition has been arguing - that change “can only come from above, from the 
rational action of the major powers following rational self-interest” (George, 
1996: 52). 
Critical social movements are also associated with asserting alternative 
representations that are based on the experiences of people everywhere. They 
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reveal that categories such as First and Third World, East and West, North and 
South are not distinct places but interpenetrated ones (Walker, 1988: 19-21). 
They represent “new sites of collective political identification” (Connolly, 
1996: 153) and newly “emerging forms of human solidarity” (Walker, 1988: 
8). They are practices of boundary making in terms of redefining the 
boundaries of civil society (Camilleri, 1990: 35). In addition to multiple 
sources of identity-making, critical social movements point to “the multiple 
sources of insecurity” (Walker, 1988: 122). 
Yet, one must approach the issue of social movements with caution 
and avoid idealizing them (George, 1996: 68). Acknowledging their potential 
for challenging the dominant discourse and changing it does not mean fixing 
them as a homogenous unit. On the contrary, it is necessary to recognize that 
“although they are part of a global struggle in one (interdependent) world, they 
represent also a politics of difference” (George, 1996: 67).  
Focusing on the human agency in the Middle Eastern context, Bilgin 
(2002) argues for a critical assessment of the social movements case by case 
as some of them can be statist as well or engage in zero-sum and violent 
practices. The examples of “the Nestlé Boycott, the anti-apartheid campaign 
for South Africa and the campaign against nuclear missile deployments in 
Europe” (2002: 111), women’s movements during the Intifada, and the 1980s 
peace movements are given as examples of social movements that form a part 
of the struggle against statist, zero-sum and violent practices. On the other 
 
 
95 
 
hand, although providing security and services to some people, Islamist 
movements such as the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria and Hamas are not 
considered as movements that challenge statism since they aim at seizing the 
state power adopting violent and zero-sum practices. At this point, the role of 
the intellectual – in not just assessing these movements, but also serving as 
guides for them in a reciprocal relationship – becomes crucial (Bilgin, 2002: 
112-3; Wyn Jones, 1995). 
Walker (1988: 26-32) distinguishes between critical social movements 
and other movements on the basis of their relation with the dominant 
discourse and the state power. The others – including old social movements of 
nationalism and socialism – do not constitute challenges to the dominant 
discourse; on the contrary they recreate that discourse by attempting at 
obtaining the state power. The new movements are not homogeneous as well, 
many of them are “deeply reactionary and parochial”, “act as a mere safety 
valve, as tame critics co-opting or deflecting the energy available for 
fundamental change” (Walker, 1988: 30). Critical social movements on the 
other hand view power as having a say on their own everyday lives, i.e. 
“control over the way they live” (Walker, 1988: 151) or having a control over 
their security (Bilgin, 2002: 111). Based on Walker’s One World Many 
Worlds (1988), Magnusson (1990: 52-3) enumerates several features of social 
movements that are democratic: plurality in the sense that there are multiple 
movements and one can be part of how many s/he wants; impermanency in the 
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sense that how long a movement lasts depends on its members’ enthusiasm; 
inchoateness in the sense that there is no authoritative relations, no complete 
or fixed membership and everyone is involved in the decision-making process 
and in the activities; inclusiveness so that “anyone can be part of a 
movement”; and finally unboundedness i.e. not being enclosures with fixed 
boundaries. This is called “movement-democracy” by Magnusson (1990: 53). 
One possible site for critical social movements is the urban space. 
Starting in 2011, urban space has once again become the point of attention due 
to social movements that either have urban issues at their core or make their 
voice through occupying public spaces. In the case of Turkey, the urban 
project of transforming one of the last parks in Taksim Square into a shopping 
mall coupled with the violent response given to the protesters is almost a 
caricature of the regime’s neoliberal authoritarianism reflected in speedy 
privatization of public space and public sectors, urban renewal projects, 
gentrification, role of construction sector in Turkey, authoritarian responses to 
any criticism or any protestation, assault on liberties, and police brutality. In 
this sense, the protests are not only a claim towards right to the city but also 
right to politics that is not limited to the urban space.  
Writing on the context of Arab Spring, Sassen (2013) argues that 
streets and squares that are mobilized are not public spaces in terms of the 
traditional European understanding of it, but they are public spaces as Global 
Street. Even if politicization of public space as Global Street and mobilization 
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do not result in empowerment of masses directly, it results in their gaining 
voice, at least making their powerlessness to be heard and made visible. This 
way they become powerless and not “invisible or impotent” (Sassen, 2013: 
24). She includes the Indignados movement in Spain, Occupy Wall Street in 
the US, the piqueteros in Latin America, and protests in the UK, China and 
Tel Aviv into examples of public space as Global Street (Sassen, 2011). For 
Sassen, both politics and history can be (re)made through making their 
presence heard and seen which is a claim to “rights to the city”, hence “to the 
country” (2013: 24).  For Soguk (2013) the effects of these protests have the 
potential of going beyond their streets, cities, countries, even regions. Those 
movements that take place in the parts of the world that are deemed as ‘non-
modern’ or ‘not yet modern’ can make those who find themselves on the 
modern part of this binary question their assumptions. Although the 
inclination is towards assessing these movements in terms of certain criteria of 
modernity and not towards assessing modernity itself, there is a possibility 
that the “moderns” will question modernity itself and not just the binary of 
modern/non-modern. 
If these movements that take place in cities or make a claim towards 
urban space go beyond their streets, their capacities to (re)make the political 
and history can go beyond ‘their’ own history (Sassen, 2013). Even in the case 
that they do not result in concrete change in their own contexts, there is 
another possibility of change which is (re)making the political and history that 
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of the way West sees and writes it. These movements might have the potential 
for the West to acknowledge its interconnectedness (Soguk, 2013).  
 
 
4.3. The Everyday and Security within the City 
 
Considering the meagre interest in social movements in traditional IR, the 
everyday attracts even less attention. Understanding the international through 
everyday life means looking at the international as experienced, constituted, 
represented and imagined in and through the everyday lives of people. The 
everyday reveals multiplicities rather than a singular idea of history, time and 
space.  
Looking at popular discourse is one way of looking at the everyday in 
terms of the international. Salter (2011: 455) wrote, “the everyday is a crucial 
part of the construction and reification of an ‘international’” in his article 
where he emphasizes video games as part of everyday among other things. 
Especially after 9/11, militarization of everyday urban life and popular culture 
are some themes that are studied focusing for instance on videogames and car-
culture (Graham, 2011). Shapiro (2009; 2010) on the other hand looks at 
literature and cinema that present a discursive mapping of cities.  
Approaches that are using Foucaultian insights as well are interested in 
the everyday as a site where power relations are most visible. It is argued that 
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power operates through the everyday at the margins making it the site where 
power shows itself most. Foucault (1980: 39) wrote:  
In thinking of the mechanisms of power, I am thinking rather of its 
capillary forms of existence, the point where power reaches into the 
very grain of individuals, touches their bodies, and inserts itself into 
their very actions and attitudes, their discourse, learning processes, and 
everyday lives. 
 
However, the everyday in this sense has a dimension of resistance as well 
since “where there is power, there is resistance” (Foucault, 1980: 95).  
In IR, feminist slogan of “personal is political” has been influential as 
well in terms of the attention given to the everyday as a site where power is 
perhaps not so visible due to the current analysis of it but where it is “deeply 
at work” (Enloe, 1997; 2011: 447; Tickner, 2001; Sylvester, 1994; 2002). 
Enloe (1989: 196) took the statement further and added “international is 
personal”. Moreover, the everyday consists of the possibility of resistance to 
these power relations more than it is realized. 
Those studies looking at the everyday in terms of resistance start with a 
warning against idealization and romanticizing (Guillaume, 2011; Richmond, 
2011a; Mac Ginty, 2008; Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2013). Outlining how the 
international studies look at the everyday, in “Resistance and the 
International”, Guillaume (2011) distinguishes between an idealized view of 
everyday and a more ‘realistic’ one that is aware of the “incidental” form of 
resistance. In a romanticized manner, the everyday is directly linked to global 
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resistance whether in the form of a global civil society mobilized for a global 
or local cause, or in the form of a resistance at the locality without “global 
networks of mobilization” struggling against the impacts of globalization 
(2011: 460). This is discussed above in relation to social movements and the 
risk of romanticising them. However, Guillaume adds, there is a third strand 
that approaches the everyday resistance through distinguishing between 
organized activities which are purposeful and intentional, and “incidental” 
activities. The incidental form of resistance consists of tactics – a term used by 
De Certeau – employed by agents who cannot escape the power relations they 
are part of. In this form of resistance, agency is assumed to be a moment of 
transformation rather than a complete appropriation of power relations. Michel 
De Certeau (1984) has been an influential scholar writing on the everyday that 
comprises the practices through which ordinary people operate. Adopting 
Foucault’s writings on resistance and De Certeau’s writings on the everyday, 
Richmond (2011a) makes a similar point to Guillaume in terms of resistance 
and critical agency not being only about direct opposition: “the point of 
resistance is to elude power rather than to confront it head on” (2011a: 422). 
This form of resistance is not revolutionary or mobilized but more of “a 
conglomeration or aggregation of fragmented and hidden everyday forms of 
resistance and agencies” that has a capacity of transforming in more “subtle” 
ways (Richmond, 2011a: 433).  
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Richmond and Mac Ginty, who write mostly on peacebuilding, place 
more critical agency on the everyday and local forms of agency. The everyday 
and local Richmond (2010; 2011b) and Mac Ginty (2011) talk about is not 
necessarily the ‘official’ local such as local elites and civil society which 
actually do not represent the everyday. In mainstream IR, resistance is 
recognized when it occurs through certain ways such as mobilization and civil 
society that are liberal institutions (Richmond, 2010; 2011b: 17). Moreover, 
these studies either romanticize the local or focus on violent local practices 
(Richmond, 2009; Mac Ginty, 2011: 210). However, resistance can be less 
visible but more “hidden and fragmented” (Richmond, 2011b: 17); it can lead 
to betterment of conditions or can be negative and seeking to maximize power 
(Mac Ginty, 2008; 2011: 211-2). Or it can be “simply people getting on with 
their lives, opting out of the formal structures and norms offered by the liberal 
peace, and creating their own solutions to local issues” (Mac Ginty, 2011: 
212). The everyday is already active and play a role in producing the 
international through reproducing, resisting or negotiating. As Richmond 
(2010: 682) stated:    
[T]he everyday represents the rebalancing and re-occupation of IR by 
real and lived experiences rather than merely as the empty and virtual 
residual space specific to powerful states and elites. It offers an 
opportunity for empathetic relations to emerge between the 
international and the everyday. 
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If one thinks in security terms, looking at the everyday and ordinary people’s 
experiences become ever more important. This weakens the presumed 
monopoly of state over security – the raison d’être of state (Darby, 2006). 
Bringing to the fore the alternative security practices enables loosening the 
grip of state over being the sole security agent. Shifting the focus to the 
everyday practices of ordinary people makes visible “neighbourhood and 
more-dispersed practices of self-securing, the shaping and use of public space 
to provide meeting places, and on the role of dissent as a form of community 
building” (2006: 460). Darby’s suggestion is that rethinking security should 
involve looking at social suffering since the studies on social suffering are 
based on everyday life and case studies. This, he wrote “is a vital corrective to 
the faceless, placeless narratives so characteristic of security texts” (2006: 
467). Based on experiences of people, literature on social suffering can help 
bring the accounts of violence and insecurity, which is constructive of those 
people’s worlds, into the security discourse. Writing on the resistance and the 
everyday, Darby (2006: 469) argues:  
I read the discourse on social suffering as above all directed toward 
understanding how some individuals and communities can resist the 
downward spiral of violence – how they can work for renewal in the 
aftermath of violence. This after all, is why scholars in the field look to 
the everyday. It is where they have placed their hope. 
 
As security as a concept has been questioned and altered in the 
direction of including issues that are relevant to the everyday life, critical 
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approaches to security – whether starting from ‘security practices’ or ‘realities 
of insecurity’ in their answer to what security is – have an emphasis on the 
everyday in their own ways. Analyses that look at security practices and 
discourses take the everyday as a site that is shaped by these practices and that 
is dominated by security ‘logic’. The everyday has a role in reproducing the 
dominant security understandings. However, there is a dimension of the 
everyday that is related to resistance as well. Huysmans (2009) specifically 
talks about the everyday as a site where security practices and understandings 
are not received as they are, but “negotiated”, “worked”, “appropriated”, 
“interacted”. This implies a site that is active rather than “passive, habitual and 
routinized” (Huysmans, 2009: 205). An analysis that takes the everyday as 
such requires looking at the process of negotiation and contestation of security 
practices in their application. It will not suffice to focus on security practices 
alone (2009: 205). 
Emancipatory approaches that take ‘realities of insecurity’ as their 
starting point take the everyday as a site of struggle in which security 
understandings are shaped. This means that the answer to ‘what is security’ is 
designated in the everyday as well and not just through top-down practices. 
These approaches brought non-state and non-professional actors to the 
forefront in the politics of security through asking whose definition of security 
gets to shape the security agenda and who provides security. Moreover, with 
the aim of deepening and broadening security, thus multiplying agents and 
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referents of security, these approaches open the possibility for recognizing the 
non-official agency in the everyday in terms of urban security. This further 
makes possible an alternative politics of security. 
On the other hand, Rowley and Weldes (2012: 515) argue that 
international security studies have not been paying enough attention to the 
everyday as a site in which “identities and in/securities are constantly 
theorized, negotiated and contested”. For the centre of attention of 
international security studies, they opt for a direction from academia and 
policy makers towards the everyday security practitioners – the ‘non-experts’ 
– as both theorists and practitioners of security who “whether explicitly aware 
of this or not” theorize in/security, prioritize some over others, negotiate or 
contest them (2012: 521). Thus, what Rowley and Weldes advocate is a shift 
in the audience and the speakers of the international security studies, speakers 
being the everyday practitioners of security. 
In this sense, looking at the security and the city from this perspective 
would reveal the agents of security within the city other than the official ones. 
Local authorities are not just those that are ‘official’ emanating or taking their 
authority from the state. Political authorities within cities are various; and they 
do not necessarily claim to be political or have a hierarchized body 
(Magnusson, 2011).  
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Including the everyday, the urban-dweller, and the non-professional 
into the struggle over what security is necessitates an analysis that focuses on 
their experiences and understandings. It is argued that more than the security 
literature, the literature that deals with development and its linkages to security 
is more engaged with this form of study through participatory methods and 
ethnographic studies (Lemanski, 2012: 63). For instance, Moser and 
McIlwaine’s research (2006) focuses on the urban dwellers, especially the 
urban poor, who lead a life of routinized violence and experience insecurity on 
a daily basis in Latin America. Trying to reach for a holistic approach, the 
authors argue that the “perceptions of the poor people themselves” should be 
included in researches. According to the writers, through this more 
participatory approach, those who face insecurities as an everyday experience 
have a voice in the researches that in the end are examined by policy makers 
for violence-reduction policies. Most studies that focus on urban dwellers’ own 
experiences and expressions of their everyday lives in mostly segregated 
communities find out that security issues related to crime, violence, threat of 
eviction, displacement, demolition of houses, exclusion and marginalization 
are expressed as dominating their everyday lives and practices (Lemanski, 
2012). Urban poverty is regarded as one of the most important issues related to 
urban security. As a setback on the MDGs it is shown that “improving the lives 
of a growing number of urban poor remains a monumental challenge” (UN 
2011: 4-5 cited in Thomas and Williams, 2012: 303). It is argued that poverty 
 
 
106 
 
stricken urban areas experience normalization of violence as a daily 
occurrence. Gun culture mostly among the unemployed male youth in major 
cities such as “Lagos, Rio de Janeiro and Nairobi” is one example among many 
(Thomas and Williams, 2012). 
Looking at urban violence as a poverty issue risks linking poor 
communities directly to violence. This is especially the case when the poorer 
urban dwellers are represented as the perpetrators of violence and crime, 
whereas they are more victims than perpetrators. Moreover, urban violence is 
represented as a threat to the security of the city and the region in some cases. 
However, associating violence directly with poverty – hence with a group of 
people – negates their agency (Moser and McIlwaine, 2006: 97). Nevertheless, 
as a result of vertical and horizontal inequalities, exclusion and 
marginalization, violence is more likely to exist in poor communities as 
poverty can accelerate violence (Thomas and Williams, 2012; Moser and 
McIlwaine, 2006). With the effects of neo-Marxist and Dependency arguments 
in the 1970s and 1980s, the literature turned towards structural causes rather 
than criminal pathology for a better understanding of urban violence. With this 
shift, urban violence escaped from being understood as an individual issue 
mostly related to urbanization and migration portraying the migrant as the 
marginal other; it also became a development concern (Moser and McIlwaine, 
2006: 90). 
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Acknowledging the structural factors that link poverty and violence 
should not necessarily mean disregarding how those people cope with these 
issues on a daily basis and how they engage in the practices of security. After 
all, “victimhood and agency are intertwined” (Orjuela, 2010: 105). It is not 
only the wealthier that resorts to private security for the provision of security. 
The poorer and excluded communities as well find ways of providing security 
for themselves through community groups such as gangs, mobs and vigilante 
groups or in simpler ways such as “dogs, window grilles and high fences” 
(Lemanski, 2004: 106). Both practices, while producing feelings of security 
and order for those communities, can produce feelings of insecurity, disorder, 
exclusion, segregation and violence at the same time. 
Thus in their everyday life, people already engage in these practices 
sometimes in cooperation with officials and at times through opposition. Some 
urban dwellers find their own systems of securing their neighbourhoods 
through surveillance (Krause, 2013: 237), while some people engage in 
‘planning’ that is not long term but that occurs through temporary moments of 
appropriation of space that eventually transform the urban space (Mack, 2013: 
157).  
Urban planning and security through design is a related aspect of these 
practices that are exemplified above. These examples show that cities are a 
result of a combination of the everyday or informal actions and the formal 
processes of design and planning (Calhoun et al., 2013). However, resembling 
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what Richmond (2010: 689) and Mac Ginty (2011) discuss in the context of 
“hybrid peace” which is a combination of the liberal form of peace and the 
everyday-local, this ‘hybrid’ form of planning of urban space can be a more 
negative one that reflects disciplinary and exclusionary politics, while at the 
same time it can be a more positive one that reflects the agency of the 
everyday.  
As discussed in the previous chapter, urban planning is an important 
aspect of security practices in the city. One example of a negative combination 
is the measures taken against homeless and young people in cities to prevent 
them from sleeping in public areas, sitting, loitering, and skate-boarding (for 
example see Moving Sound Technologies, 2014). In London for example, 
spikes and studs situated outside by a real estate agent to prevent sleeping and 
sitting has been met with controversy and ended up in people protesting and 
cementing over the spikes or some establishments removing them (Taylor, 11 
June 2014). On the other hand, it is possible to go in the other direction as it 
was the case when a charity organization raised awareness of homelessness 
through placing benches that make shelter and sleeping easier in Vancouver 
public space (Whitnall, 26 June 2014). It is possible to have an inclusionary 
type of planning and design that can be provided by different agents and that 
addresses other insecurities. Weber and Lacy (2011) inquires the ways for 
redesigning security through including others who will bring alternative 
practices. As technology shapes our understandings of security and insecurity 
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and of ourselves as well, including others into the process of planning and 
technology will result in questioning ethico-politically the existing 
understanding of the relationship between security, design, technology and 
human beings; hence it will result in changing security politics. One example 
of this form of ‘critical design’ is Casa Segura which is situated in Arizona 
desert providing shelter, food and water to those migrants crossing the border 
illegally (Weber and Lacy, 2011: 1032-1034; Casa Segura, 2014). Moreover, it 
provides access to internet so that those who are passing can communicate 
through a website that was created for that purpose.  
The combination of informality and formality is as well reflected in the 
search for security at the everyday through community-based security groups. 
Although informal groups are depicted as “new urban insurgency”, criminals 
and at times terrorists, their relationship to the formal authorities is complex. 
For instance, informal urbanization may be a way of giving up state’s 
responsibilities of providing security for those informal settlers in the face of 
urban growth such as formal housing, access to water, sewerage and sanitation. 
In Cairo starting from the late 1960s, overlooking and even encouraging 
informal urbanization by the state provided the grounds for a lack of resistance 
against elite urbanization. Gated communities and elite formal housing 
hindered possibilities for alternative shelters for the informal settlers while at 
the same time they were attempts of protection from disordered informal 
urbanity. Egyptian state prioritized elite housing and did not pay much 
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attention to overall urbanization of its capital Cairo except for the times when 
international assistance and funding was provided from Western institutions 
such as USAID (Dorman, 2009). 
Therefore, informality in the city of Cairo both resulted from 
authoritarian, exclusionary and elitist Egyptian top-down policies and ensured 
the continuation of these policies at the same time. The government only 
symbolically acted against informal urbanization through securitizing those 
zones, and this only happened when the government was concerned being 
conceived as not being able to control its capital city especially in the eyes of 
the international community. Through securitization and criminalization of 
these informal areas, the government showed itself as not tolerating 
informality. Furthermore, any form of resistance in these areas such as that of 
Islamist militants was depoliticized. The exclusion of these people from 
politics was grounded on their informal actions (Dorman, 2009: 436). Most 
importantly though, prioritization of elite housing over non-elite housing and 
neglect of informal areas went unnoticed and were not problematized while at 
the same time attention was paid to the informal areas as the root of all the 
problems that the city was facing (Dorman, 2009: 436). The case of informal 
Cairo complicates the picture that informality is a form of direct opposition or 
a result of power vacuum that state tries to fill. At times it is encouraged by 
formal institutions unwilling to take the responsibility by preventing and 
reversing informal urbanization. 
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Informality and state’s neglect of it in Cairo were a result of a 
combination of factors none of which explained the situation on its own: state’s 
underdevelopment and inability for urban development, liberalization and 
economic austerity starting in the 1970s, international funding, and 
authoritarian and exclusionary politics of the state. 
Other factors that affect these practices of urban exclusion, 
displacement and urban renewal include human security discourse reflected in 
the concerns about the security of residents in ruined buildings and as victims 
of crimes (Rasmussen, 2007; Jensen, 2010). It as well includes regional 
security (Jütersonke et al., 2009) and security of the city reflected in the 
concerns about the zones of danger, crime and violence in the city (Rasmussen, 
2007; Jütersonke et al., 2009) and the competitiveness and integration of the 
city in the global economy (Rasmussen, 2007; Ismail, 2009). At other times, 
exclusionary practices can be linked to national security, terrorism and global 
war on terror (Orjuela, 2010) and can be presented as the only way of 
eliminating the obstacles in front of development, modernization, 
reconstruction (Orjuela, 2010), and democratization (Jensen, 2010). 
As a result several insecurities arise for those that are presented as 
threats or subjects of security and development. Physical insecurity, exclusion, 
loss of rights as citizens and loss of rights to the (inner) city, eviction, hence 
loss of shelter, jobs, belongingness are some of the everyday insecurities 
experienced by these urban dwellers (Rasmussen, 2007; Jensen, 2010; Orjuela, 
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2010; Lemanski, 2012). Police forces generally are another source of insecurity 
due to corruption or inefficiency (Orjuela, 2010; Lemanski, 2012). 
These practices that involve both national and international actors 
reveal the common understanding that those spaces of authority or “security 
spaces” are unoccupied as they are left empty by the state and their re-
appropriation should come easily and naturally (Ismail, 2009). However, albeit 
informal, partly legitimate actors appropriate those spaces competing and at 
times collaborating with formal authorities. Urban dwellers find and learn new 
ways of going on in their everyday lives.  
Some of the factors that prepare the ground for these authorities to 
emerge are long periods of armed conflicts, access to small arms, 
authoritarianism, indifference of state, migration, deportation, social exclusion, 
inequality, limited access to formal economy and formal housing opportunities, 
search for survival in the streets and a place for belonging, structural 
adjustment programs, privatization and liberalization of urban space (Hammar, 
2007; Rasmussen, 2007; Dorman, 2009; Jütersonke et al., 2009; Ismail, 2009; 
Jensen, 2010; Orjuela, 2010; Lemanski, 2012). These informal authorities take 
responsibility over securing the neighbourhood, supplying surveillance for 
preventing crimes and ensuring order, provide education and moral guidance, 
and provide and engage in alternative money making opportunities (Wood et 
al., 2007; Dorman, 2009; Ismail, 2009; Lemanski, 2012).  
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It is possible to argue that, if made visible, urban dwellers and (despite 
their violent, exclusionary and disciplining action) informal authorities that 
experience and deal with everyday urban insecurities present a potential for 
more inclusionary and rights-based understanding of security through their 
claims and struggles over “urban inclusion, housing and labor” (Jensen, 2010), 
over democratic rights in terms of formal housing and over right to the (inner) 
city (Rasmussen, 2007; Ismail, 2009).  
It is argued that it is the practices at the bottom that make possible cities 
to exist rather than sovereign decisions (Magnusson, 2011). Urban space is a 
specific site that works through a certain way of life. In that, cities hold the 
potential of peaceful co-existence of different groups. The everyday practices 
of self-government and self-regulation of people in the urban space make this 
possible when certain regulations and practices are internalized by its 
inhabitants and continue to be reproduced. In this sense, cities are “self-
organizing” and the potential for peaceful coexistence is already there in the 
way cities are ‘built’ or come to be organized. At the same time, the city is a 
site of social struggle where a plurality of politics of security operates. These 
struggles over the politics of securing and bordering the city can be analysed 
through ‘the right to the city’ concept. 
One of the scholars who wrote and elaborated extensively on the issue 
of “the right to the city” is David Harvey, according to whom: 
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The right to the city is far more than the individual liberty to access 
urban resources: it is a right to change ourselves by changing the city. 
It is, moreover, a common rather than an individual right since this 
transformation inevitably depends upon the exercise of a collective 
power to reshape the processes of urbanization. The freedom to make 
and remake our cities and ourselves is, I want to argue, one of the most 
precious yet most neglected of our human rights. (Harvey, 2008: 24) 
 
The right to the city for Harvey is crucial in the struggle of everyday people 
for having an equal saying in the process of urbanization which is directly 
linked to the way capitalism works, hence linked to neoliberalism. He posits 
right to the city the utmost importance in terms of resistance against 
urbanization not least because it is the twin process of neoliberalism. 
Consequently his concluding remarks in his essay on “the right to the city” are 
“Lefebvre was right to insist that the revolution has to be urban, in the 
broadest sense of that term, or nothing at all” (2008: 40).  
The term originally belongs to Lefebvre who used it in terms of 
struggles over (re)making of urban space. Similar to the way Harvey adopted 
it, Lefebvre does not use it in the limited sense of urban environment as a 
bounded entity or in the sense of a territorial claim to the city, but uses in a 
more general sense related to urbanization of the planet and blurring of the line 
between urban and non-urban (Lefebvre, 1970 [2003]). Thus, right to the city 
signifies as well a claim to a share in the decision-making and (re)making of 
how the things work, to “a just access to resources” and “a claim upon society” 
(Gilbert and Dikeç, 2008: 254); it signifies “struggles over the conditions and 
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inequalities of globalization and urban life” (253). Rather than a territorial, 
separated and bounded category of urban, the right to the city puts forward and 
forces an understanding of the urban “as the (re)producer of social relations of 
power, and the right to participation in it” (254). 
But whose right is the right to the city exactly? Lefebvre includes non-
citizens in his approach linking the right to the city to “the right to difference”. 
The right to difference is about resisting and struggling against 
marginalization, being divided as categories, “discrimination and repression”, 
“exclusion, segregation, and criminalization” (Gilbert and Dikeç, 2008). Very 
relevant to the question whose right it is the right to the city, Erensu (2014) 
questions whether the ‘guests’ in the case of Syrian refugees coming to Turkey 
have this right as well. What influences the people’s ideas and imaginations 
living in those cities before ‘guests’ have arrived cannot be separated from 
their ideas on the nation-state, imaginations of the global, local and urban. She 
lists some of these interdependent factors as urban policies and foreign policy 
of the current government especially in terms of Syria, constituting everything 
that is foreign as a threat including the global asylum regime, and the 
imagination of the space of urban as a fixed and territorial unit. Then she 
questions whether it is possible to have a “right to the ‘transit’ city”. In fact, 
Lefebvre (1989 [2014]) points out that since movement has become the 
essence of the city, it is impossible to make a separation between those who 
move and those who do not. Moreover, he points at how the flows of ideas, 
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peoples, and knowledge make the relations in the city more international. Thus, 
he claims it is better to talk of the city dweller rather than the citizen, and urban 
citizenship rather than national citizenship in terms of the right to the city since 
the former terms are more inclusive (Gilbert and Dikeç, 2008). One example of 
this inclusiveness in terms of the right to the city that forms a potential for 
security as co-existence is the City of Sanctuary movement that started in the 
US in the 1980s and in the UK in 2005. Sanctuary cities welcome asylum 
seekers and refugees who arrive to those cities where a mutual interaction 
occurs between the newcomers and receivers (Bilgiç, 2014).  
For security (within the city) to be security as co-existence, the 
dominant understanding of security needs to be questioned. As the previous 
chapter showed, the official discourse of security tends to be exclusionary, 
violent and produce wider insecurities. To realize this, it is necessary to shift 
the referents to others than the official agents that define security such as the 
state and professionals. Urban dwellers’ own understandings and everyday 
practices reveal other insecurities and other ways of ‘doing’ security. Their 
struggles in and through the urban space can be a first step of the shift towards 
an alternative politics of security that is inclusionary and that is responsive to 
insecurities of the wider community.  
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4.4. Conclusion 
 
This chapter aimed to rethink the everyday and the local as an active site of 
struggle over the definitions and practices of security and the politics of the 
international. As the everyday in the city provides a ground for an alternative 
politics of security, it as well challenges and constitutes alternative borders of 
the international.  
The urban space is taken as a site where global and local, or the 
international and the everyday are interpenetrated. Thus the categories of the 
international, the city, the everyday, the global and the local are not really 
taken as categories or binaries but considered in a relational understanding. In 
this relationship, the everyday is taken as a site of struggle in which there is 
the potentiality of highlighting the existing politics of security as exclusionary 
practices of securing and bordering the city. More importantly, through this 
struggle between multiple understandings and practices of security that 
includes informal and formal, non-professional and official, local and 
international understandings and practices of security, the everyday as the site 
of these struggles has the potentiality of an alternative politics of security 
(within the city). 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
The aim of this thesis was to question the interaction between borders of the 
international and the city. The main problematic in this relationship was how 
different interactions resulted in – and in turn shaped by – different 
understandings and politics of security. In line with this aim, Chapter 2 
problematized the traditional imagination of the international that consisted of 
borders as territorial state walls. It aimed to go beyond a two-sided discussion 
of a ‘borderless world’ and a world with impervious and rigid state frontiers. 
To go beyond this discussion, the concept of border was decentred beyond the 
state, and it was reconceptualised as a practice that constitutes and shapes 
while demarcating. Through this reconceptualization, different agents of 
bordering were revealed such as security professionals, urban planners, social 
movements and ordinary people. Thus, bordering was argued to be a daily 
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practice rather than a practice only exercised at exceptional moments by the 
state.  
The city as a border area and a site of social struggle with its 
multiplicity of  experiences of time and space was introduced  in Chapter 2 to 
question the borders of the international and the relationship between ‘here’ 
and ‘there’, ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ that is increasingly formed within and across 
cities. It is argued that the relationship of cities to the globalizing economy is 
crucial for the borders of the international. However, the literature that focuses 
on this relationship tends to reproduce the binary imagination of global and 
local similar to the dichotomous imagination produced by IR in terms of the 
everyday and the international. It is argued that looking at multiple experiences 
of time and space within cities is a way of overcoming this binary imagination. 
This is related to two points.  
First, it necessitates taking globalization and the processes that are 
associated with it (neoliberalism, urbanization, deterritorialization and 
reterritorialization) as occurrences happening ‘in-here’ in relation to ‘out-
there’, rather than inherently outside processes with a singular logic. This was 
discussed in Chapter 3 in relation to the politics of security of the city. It 
showed how these processes worked through ‘securing’ and bordering the city 
combined with discourses of human security, national security, global security 
and international security.  
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Second, it necessitates taking the everyday as an active site that has a 
role in these processes through negotiating, challenging, resisting, or working 
upon. This was discussed in Chapter 4 in relation to the possibility of an 
alternative politics of security through questioning the potentials of an 
understanding of security within the city that is inclusionary, right and needs 
based and based on co-existence. Whereas Chapter 3 focused on the ways in 
which dominant, exclusionary, and violent security practices shaped the 
everyday, Chapter 4 inquired the ways in which the everyday shapes and can 
shape the politics of urban security.  
Chapter 3 focused on three sets of practices as bordering the city: 
warfare, planning and practices related to urbanization such as urban 
regeneration projects. It is argued that these practices – that are not so 
independent from each other – securitize the everyday, militarize the urban 
space, make everyone a potential threat, criminalize certain groups, make 
everyone responsible for their own and their neighbourhood’s security, 
colonize the everyday and segregate space into centre and periphery-like units 
such as ghettoes, destroy capabilities for resistance, challenge and 
independence while at the same time depoliticizing these practices through 
making those issues part of an expertise, technology, planning and 
development. Moreover, these practices reveal the interconnectedness between 
‘inside’ and ‘outside’, ‘here’ and ‘there’ as security knowledges, practices and 
techniques circulate and security becomes privatized. The critique of the 
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existing politics of security that prioritizes certain groups or spaces under the 
name of security of the city combined with other discourses of security is a first 
step towards a more bottom-up understanding of security and the borders of the 
international.  
This task is taken up in Chapter 4 where the everyday and local are 
discussed in relation to agency and resistance. The everyday is not taken as a 
level of analysis but as a site that transcends boundaries created by binaries of 
inside-outside. To analyse the potential of resistance, the local is examined in 
two ways without idealization and romanticization: social movements and the 
everyday. Through focusing on different voices and experiences within the 
city, the role of the everyday in the politics of (urban) security is analysed. It is 
argued that a combination of informal and formal, unofficial and official 
understandings and practices operate at the everyday urban space constituting 
the politics of (urban) security. Thus, it is never a simple picture where state 
officials and security professionals act and others accept or react to those 
practices of security. Plus, the space where official and formal actors do not 
act, i.e. space vacated by the state, is never an empty space. Other actors – be it 
informal, unofficial or ordinary people – are engaged in ‘doing’ security in 
those spaces in order to provide security or order for themselves.  
Starting with such an analysis Chapter 4 inquires the possibility of a 
politics of security that is oriented towards inclusionary practices of security 
based on the right to the city approach. This analysis as well provides a 
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different imagination of the international based on borders cutting across cities, 
and attempts to bring forward a potential for an imagination that realizes the 
interconnectedness of the international and the everyday, global and local, 
making visible both different sources of insecurity and different agents that 
‘do’ security in the context of the city. 
This thesis had two central arguments. First, it is argued that the way 
the international exists is interwoven into the everyday life of cities. Cities are 
centres of global economy, global flows and international decision making 
processes. This argument that the international exists or works through cities 
suggests searching the agency of this process in the urban context. This thesis 
argues, especially after 1980s and the end of the Cold War with neoliberal 
globalization and urbanization, one way in which the existing politics of the 
international is sustained is through the politics of security in the urban context. 
The international and the insecurities stemming from the politics of the 
international are maintained through bordering, hence (re)organizing the urban 
space.   
The existing security understandings and practices of urban warfare, 
planning, design, and urban development and regeneration projects are some 
examples of how politics of security prioritizes order and risk avoidance over 
other insecurities stemming from socio-economic inequalities. What is more to 
the point is that the latter insecurities are taken as sources of insecurity for the 
former ones. This is evident in the way organized and petty-crime, anti-social 
 
 
123 
 
behaviour, drugs, community-based security groups are prioritized, and 
underdevelopment, poverty, and migration is securitized. By way of this, 
existing politics of security makes unnoticed how these are symptoms of 
insecurities generated by socio-economic inequalities for different groups of 
urban dwellers. Existing practices and understandings of security do not only 
reproduce and depoliticize these insecurities, but produce new ones through 
bordering cities, by (re)organization of urban space, and produce ‘responsible’ 
and ‘proper’ subjects for the existing politics of security and the international.  
By showing the way international is constituted through cities and the 
way its politics is maintained through politics of security within cities, this 
thesis highlighted the need for rethinking the international and security. In this 
sense, rethinking the international is about realizing how it is ‘here’ rather than 
‘outside’ of state borders. The international is ‘here’, for instance, in and across 
cities. Borders of the international, an inside and an outside are located within 
and across cities. These are constituted, maintained and protected through 
politics of security. Then, rethinking security is about problematizing the taken 
for granted understanding of security and realizing the way it becomes an 
instrument for securing the status quo whether or not the status quo means 
insecurities for different referents. As different discourses of security with 
different referents such as city, public, state, region, and international are 
employed within cities, rethinking security and politicizing security entails 
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questioning whose security it is and the way boundaries of the political 
community are drawn through these practices.  
The city as a site that witnesses bordering practices of the international 
is the focal point of this thesis in rethinking the international and security. The 
everyday life within cities, however, is not passive. Bordering is not only a 
source of insecurity. It is as well a source of resistance. Urban dwellers daily 
engage in bordering in cities. This leads to the second central argument of the 
thesis. This thesis argued that city’s significance for the international does not 
only come from its place in its workings, but more importantly comes from its 
being the site where potentiality of change lies. It is where people engage, 
interact with and experience the international daily. Thereby, it is where 
change can come from. In this light, this thesis highlighted the need for 
rethinking the everyday to make visible urban dweller’s agency and possibility 
for resistance and transformation as they daily negotiate, consider, and work 
out, resist and challenge the politics of the international, security and the city. 
They resist and challenge as well. This thesis argued that a change in who 
defines what security is and what the sources of insecurity are can be possible 
within the urban context through urban dweller’s claim of right to be involved 
in the (re)organization of urban space, of ‘right to the city’ and to difference, 
hence politics of the international.  
Cities have become part of the spatial vocabulary of the international. 
Through reorganization of urban space, this thesis argued that borders of the 
 
 
125 
 
international are practiced and through the existing politics of security these 
borders are secured. Moreover, the thesis highlighted the city not just in terms 
of a site where inequalities are reproduced, maintained and depoliticized 
through politics of urban security that prioritizes order and stability, but as a 
site where urban dwellers interact with and at times counteract the international 
and security. This thesis illustrated the city as a site to focus in inquiring the 
agency of the international and searching potentialities for change. 
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